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OPEN CHAMBERS?
Richard W. Painter*
CLOSED CHAMBERS:

THE

FIRST EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF THE

THE SUPREME COURT.
By Edward
LazarU,S. New York: Times Books. 1998. Pp. xii, 576. $27.50.
EPIC

STRUGGLES

INSIDE

Edward Lazarus1 has written the latest account of what goes on
behind the marble walls of the Supreme Court. His book is not the
first to selectively reveal confidential communications between the
Justices and their law clerks. Another book, Bob Woodward and
Scott Armstrong's The Brethren2 achieved that distinction in 1979.
Closed Chambers: The First Eyewitness Account of the Epic Strug
gles Inside the Supreme Court, however, adds a new twist. Whereas
The Brethren was written by journalists who persuaded former law
clerks to breach the confidences of the Justices, Lazarus was himself
a law clerk to Justice Harry Blackmun.
Closed Chambers is a well-written book. Lazarus's prose is con
cise and colorful. His doctrinal discussions are alive with details
from the lives of the persons who brought cases before the Court.
Many of these were African-American capital defendants in the
South ranging from the Scottsboro Boys in the 1930s, nine men who
almost certainly did not commit the crime of rape for which eight of
them were sentenced to die in Alabama (pp. 77-85), to Warren
McCleskey, who was executed in 1991 for murdering an Atlanta
police officer while participating in a robbery, although he may not
have fired the fatal shots (pp. 170-81). The book's use of historical
material provides perspective on how social norms and politics in
fluence the Justices, as well as the Court's history of confrontation
with other branches of government, from Chief Justice Taney's per
nicious use of substantive due process to flout the Missouri Com
promise in Dred Scott (pp. 246-47) to the Court's dismantling of
state death penalty statutes in the 1960s and 1970s (pp. 86-118). Far
* Professor, University of Illinois College of Law. B.A. 1984, Harvard; J.D. 1987, Yale.
Professor Painter graduated from Yale Law School with Edward Lazarus and several of the
former Supreme Court clerks mentioned in Closed Chambers. - Ed. I am grateful to Dean
Anthony Kronman for helpful comments on this Book Review and to Tiffany Yonker for
helpful research assistance.

1. Mr. Lazarus is
California.

an

Assistant United States Attorney for the Central District of

2. BOB WOODWARD & Seo= ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME
CouRT (1979). But see infra note 84 (discussing memoirs written before The Brethren in
which former clerks made limited disclosures, usually years after the death of the Justices for
whom they clerked).
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from being a digression, anecdote and history aptly frame Lazarus's
portrait of the Court in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
Nonetheless, many reviewers have criticized the book for a vari
ety of inaccuracies3 and exaggerations.4 Others question the reality
3. See, e.g., David
Court is not impressed,

J. Garrow, Dissenting Opinion: A witness from inside the Supreme
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1998 (book review) at 26 ("Closed Chambers is a
worthwhile book for students of Supreme Court history, but it is not a book general readers
should rely upon for an accurate and dependable contemporary portrait."). Several reviews,
cited separately below, appear at JURIST: BooKS-ON-LAw (May 1998) <http://jurist.law.pitt.
edu/lawbooks/revmay98.htm>. Ironically, most of the book's inaccuracies are not in the his
torical material, but in Lazarus's account of the Court's more recent past. Lazarus describes
Justice Souter as "a vocal dissenter in [Employment Div. v.j Smith," p. 511 n.*, even though
Justice Souter was not even on the Court when Smith was decided. See David M. O'Brien,
Breaching Confidence, Court Bashing, and Bureaucratic Justice, JURIST: BooKs-oN-LAw
(May 1998) <http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/lawbooks/revmay98.htm#Brien> (pointing out this er
ror); Edward Lazarus, Disturbing Truths, JURIST: BooKS-ON-LAW (July 1998) <http://jurist.
law.pitt.edu/lawbooks/revjul98.htm#Lazarus> (acknowledging this error in response to book
reviews). Lazarus also reports that Justice O'Connor "so distrusted Brennan - for having
hoodwinked her in some unnamed past case - that she refused to join any of his majority
opinions for the Court," p. 277, a statement disproved by the fact that Justice O'Connor
joined seven of Brennan's majority opinions in the year of Lazarus's clerkship alone, while
Brennan joined seven of hers. See Alex Kozinski, Conduct Unbecoming, 108 YALE L.J. 835,
851 n.104 (reviewing Closed Chambers) (citing seven majority opinions by Justice Brennan
joined by Justice O'Connor); id. at 851 n.105 (citing seven majority opinions by Justice
O'Connor joined by Justice Brennan); see also Garrow, supra (same).
Lazarus reports that Chief Justice Rehnquist "relisted" Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833 (1992), postponing consideration of the petition for certiorari until the Justices' next
weekly conference, because Rehnquist hoped "to push off oral argument until the fall . . .
[and] delay a final ruling until sometime in 1993, long after the [1992] election." P. 463.
According to Lazarus, "Rehnquist did not relist Casey only once; he did it several weeks
running (exactly how many is not known)." P. 463. A call to the office of the Supreme Court
Clerk, however, confirms that the petition in Casey, originally scheduled for conference on
January 10, 1992, was relisted exactly once, for the conference on January 17, and that the
order granting certiorari was filed on January 21. See Kozinski, supra, at 852; see also Gar
row, supra (reporting that relisting "is standard practice when the Court reformulates the
question that a case presents, as it did in Casey. Rehnquist may or may not have wanted to
delay Casey, but he did not do what Closed Chambers says he did.").
Toward the end of the book, Lazarus states that, when convicted murderer Robert Alton
Harris was strapped in a chair in California's gas chamber, "two minutes later, astonishingly,
the phone rang. It was Judge Warren Pregerson of the Ninth Circuit, issuing yet another
stay." P. 508. What is astonishing about this account is not Judge Pregerson's telephone call
(the Ninth Circuit issued several last minute stays in this case alone), but the fact that
Lazarus, who clerked for Judge William Norris on the Ninth Circuit when Judge Pregerson
was his colleague, apparently does not know that "Warren" appears nowhere in the name of
Judge Harry Pregerson. Two pages earlier, Lazarus states that a Ninth Circuit panel "consist
ing of Judges Richard Alarcon, Melvin Brunetti and John Noonan" granted, over Judge
Noonan's dissent, the State of California's petition to dissolve a district court's stay in the
Harris case. P. 506. This is true, except for the fact that Judge Alarcon's first name is Arthur,
not Richard. See Kozinski, supra, at 854 & n.120 (noting that this error is "particularly em
barrassing as Lazarus clerked on the Ninth Circuit (one floor above Alarcon) and regularly
appears before the court in his capacity as an Assistant United States Attorney for the Cen
tral District of California"). Lazarus would have benefited enormously in his discussion of
the Harris case - in more respects than simply getting the judges' names right - if he had
read Judge Noonan's detailed discussion of the case in the Stanford Law Review. See John T .
Noonan, Jr., Horses of the Night: Harris v . Vasquez, 4 5 STAN. L . REv. 1011 (1993). Appar
ently, however, Lazarus settled for reading, and referring to, Judge Noonan's brief editorial
in the New York Times. Pp. 508 & 546 n.21 (citing John T. Noonan, Jr., Should State Execu
tions Run on Schedule? N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1992, at A17).
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of Lazarus's vision of nonpoliticized Supreme Court decisionmak
ing, based on "good faith and self-denial,"5 which he believes to
have been "vanquished" by the Robert Bork confirmation hear
ings.6 Finally, Lazarus has been taken to task for overstating the
Errors such as these could have been avoided if Lazarus had given as much attention to
detail as he gave to his prose.
4. The most egregious exaggeration in the book is Lazarus's statement that the Court's
October Term 1988 "must rank with the New Deal watershed of 1937 and the year of Brown
[v. Board of Education], 1954, as the most decisive in this century." Pp. 261-62. The 1988-89
Term did include some important cases. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361
{1989) {holding that provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 that direct the federal
Sentencing Commission to set Sentencing Guidelines did not violate the separation of pow
ers doctrine); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 {1989) (striking down Rich
mond's preference for minority contractors); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (striking
down a state statute prohibiting flag burning); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573
{1989) (interpreting the Establishment Clause to bar a holiday display on government prop
erty); Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (partially affirming Roe v.
Wade). The 1988-89 Term, however, did not include any of the decisions that rank with the
1954 decision in Brown v. Board as forming the foundation of modern constitutional law,
such as Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 {1963), and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966), both of which dramatically expanded the rights of criminal defendants; Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), which held that a statute prohibiting sale of contraceptives
violated a substantive due process right to privacy; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), which
expanded this right to cover abortion; and New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964),
which {happily for Lazarus) made it extraordinarily difficult for public figures, such as
Supreme Court Justices, to sue for libel.

As far as "watershed" constitutional crisis is concerned, the 1988-89 Term was insignifi
cant, particularly when compared with President Roosevelt's frontal assault on the Court in
the 1930s, President Eisenhower's decision to enforce the Court's desegregation decrees with
federal troops in the 1950s, and the Court's unanimous order that President Nixon turn
White House tapes over to federal prosecutors in 1974. Lazarus's exaggeration of the impor
tance of his clerkship Term simply is not in line with historical reality. See Garrow, supra
note 3 ("Lazarus's characterization of his own year (in such language) is risible."); O'Brien,
supra note 3 (concluding that this characterization of Lazarus's own term "raises questions
about Lazarus's sense of judgment - judgment of history and other matters").
5. P. 249. See David Kairys, Reason Worship, JURIST: BOOKS-ON-LAW (May 1998)
<http://jurist.Iaw.pitt.edu/lawbooks/revmay98.htm#Kairys> ("The central problem for
Lazarus and this book - and for this dominant mode of legal scholarship - is to document
the norm, compared to which the injection of politics can be described as a deviation.").
Kairys correctly points out that most of the Court's opinions that Lazarus admires, such as
Brown v. Board, involved a heavy dose of politics, not mere legal reasoning. In another
example, Lazarus claims that the Court of Chief Justice John Marshall "overcame sharp divi
sions and succeeded in separating the interests of the Court and of the Constitution from
politics." P. 10. Kairys points out, however, that Chief Justice Marshall, in the most famous
case of that era, Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), was under threat of
impeachment by the Republicans if he did not rule in their favor. Marshall's opinion thus
"weaves through a range of issues to establish judicial review without really using it," and is
"not an opinion one can hold up as free of contemporary politics, faults of legal reasoning, or
close attention to practical and political results." Kairys, supra.
6. P. 249. Politicized confirmation battles, however, are nothing new. The acrimony and
accusation that characterized the hearings for Robert Bork in 1987 and Clarence Thomas in
1991 echoed the atmosphere surrounding Justice Abraham Fortas's resignation and President
Nixon's unsuccessful nomination of two conservative jurists, Clement Haynsworth and
Harrold Carswell, to the Court in 1969. Indeed, President Wilson in 1916 triggered what was
probably the most divisive confirmation battle of the 1\ventieth Century by nominating Louis
Brandeis, a Boston lawyer who was viciously attacked for being both a Progressive and a Jew.
See ALPHEus THOMAS MAsoN, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN's LIFE 466-67 (1946).
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role of clerks in influencing the decisions of the Court.7
Surprisingly, despite some glaring parallels to more recent confirmation battles, the
Brandeis nomination goes virtually unmentioned in Lazarus's lengthy historical expose. At
his confirmation hearing, belated charges of ethical impropriety were raised against Brandeis
by accusers who, at the time the alleged conduct occurred over six years earlier, had publicly
said nothing critical of him, but who now, with the encouragement of several Senators and
their staff, came forward in the Senate committee room. The accusations - that Brandeis
had been dishonest as well as disloyal to his clients - fit conveniently into anti- Semitic ste
reotypes. The testimony of Brandeis's accusers, however, revealed the hypocrisy of Boston's
predominantly Protestant bar, which showed no greater sensitivity to conflicts in legal repre
sentations. The accusations were more about politics than ethics, and the vote to confirm
Brandeis was strictly along party lines. See Hearings on the Nomination of Louis D. Brandeis
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 64th Cong. (1916), reprinted in part and discussed
in J OHN T. NOONAN, JR. & RICHARD W. pAINTER, PROFESSIONAL AND PERSONAL REsPONSI
BILITIES OF TiiE LAWYER 382-423 (1997).
Although the Bork confirmation fight resembled the Brandeis episode in its focus on the
nominee's ideology, the Thomas nomination was a closer parallel in two other aspects: a
transparent role of race and ethnicity in the deliberations and last-minute accusations of im
propriety against the nominee. President Bush chose Thomas to replace Thurgood Marshall,
and many civil rights groups that had opposed Bork were reluctant to oppose Thomas, even
though they detested his judicial philosophy. Pp. 451, 455. The hearings took their accusa
tory turn after Senate Judiciary Committee staff members leaked to the press excerpts from
an FBI interview in which Anita Hill said that Thomas had sexually harassed her seven years
earlier when she had worked for him at the EEO C. Thomas flatly denied Hill's accusations
and for good measure accused the committee of subjecting him to a "high tech lynching." P.
454. Passions were inflamed and Thomas's approval rating in the black community soared.
See Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Putney Swope Is Dead, NE WSDAY, Nov. 8, 1992, at 40 (reporting
that immediately following the last round of hearings, "Thomas' approval rating among black
Americans, previously hovering at 54 percent, soared to 80 percent"). It was also apparent
that, for some members of the Senate, hypocrisy was in the air, and that this might only be
the first round in a political war of attrition over sexual harassment allegations, which when
denied under oath, can be compounded by allegations of perjury. After all was said and
done, the 52-48 vote to confirm was mostly along party lines, with 41 Republicans and 11
Democrats voting to confirm and 2 Republicans and 46 Democrats voting no.
7. See Garrow, supra note 3 ("Lazarus's writing is often better than his judgment. Clerks
often suffer from an exaggerated sense of their own importance."); O'Brien, supra note 3
(criticizing Lazarus's portrayal of the Court "as 'clerk driven' and composed of 'editor Jus
tices"' in part because "clerks do not write on entirely clean slates and their drafts must pass
muster with the justices"); Mark Tushnet, Hype and History, JURI ST: BooKs-oN-LAw (May
1998) <http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/lawbooks/revmay98.htm#Tushnet> ("I'd offer . .. [a] 'null
hypothesis' to test Lazarus's account: No law clerk has a substantial impact on the outcome
- a Justice's vote - in any significant case, and no law clerk has a more-than-trivial impact
on the core legal rules stated in the Court's opinions. Nothing in Lazarus's account per
suades me that the null hypothesis is false."); Lyle Denniston, 'Closed Chambers': Law
Clerk's Revenge, BALTIMORE SUN, Apr. 12, 1998, at F5 (describing the book as "captivated
by the hilariously foolish notion that the Supreme Court is really run by scheming clerks").
Dean Anthony Kronman and Kenneth Starr, among others, have correctly pointed out
that judges delegate too much of their work, particularly opinion writing, to clerks. See
ANTHONY T. KRoNMAN, THE LosT LAWYER 347-51 (1993) (discussing the "increasingly im
portant role that law clerks play in the process of opinion writing" and noting both "their
immaturity and own self-conscious lack of judgment"); Kenneth W. Starr, The Supreme
Court and the Future of the Federal Judiciary, 32 Aruz. L. REv. 211, 214-16 {1990). Lazarus
converts this observation into a conspiracy theory and dwells on unattributed accounts of
how a "cabal" of conservative clerks, most of whom he knew personally, plotted to influence
a few cases. See, e.g., pp. 251-87 (a 36-page chapter entitled "The Cabal Against the Libs");
pp. 314-15 (describing cabal influence in the Kennedy chambers in Patterson); pp. 321-22
(same); p. 391 (describing efforts by Andrew McBride, an O' Connor clerk who "presided
over the cabal," to persuade O' Connor to reverse Roe in Webster); p. 405 (describing cabal
influence on the Rehnquist chambers in Webster); p. 419 {describing a shoving match be-
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Although these criticisms collectively cast doubt on the substan
tive merit of Closed Chambers, this review will not embark on al
ready well-traveled ground by dissecting the book in search of
further inaccuracies. Rather, this review will address ethical lapses
in the book that have troubled the author of this review8 and
others, ranging from Judge Alex Kozinski of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and Anthony Kronman9, the
Dean of the Yale Law School to Tom Goldstein, the Dean of the
Columbia School of Journalism.10
tween McBride and a liberal clerk that drove them both into the courtyard fountain); p. 501
(describing efforts by cabal members to shrink the Court's habeas docket). Both conserva·
tive and liberal commentators, however, point out that Lazarus fails to demonstrate any spe·
cific influence such a "cabal" actually had. See Kozinski, supra note 3, at 866-71; Tushnet,
supra ("Lazarus doesn't convince me that there was anything special about the cabal, or even
that it was particularly influential."). In Webster, for example, although Lazarus asserts that
an O'Connor clerk presided over the cabal, p. 391, Tushnet observes that "in the end, Justice
O'Connor did what she wanted, not what the cabal wanted." Tushnet, supra. With respect to
Patterson v. McClean Credit, Tushnet points out that the circumstantial evidence all suggests
that Justice Kennedy made up his own mind to change his vote and deny Brenda Patterson's
claim under the 1866 Civil Rights Act for racial harassment on the job, rather than collapsing,
as Lazarus claims, pp. 314-15, under pressure from the cabal. Tushnet, supra.
A less glamorous but more useful exercise than publishing this courthouse gossip would
have been to compare clerks' draft opinions and bench memoranda in the publicly available
Brennan and Marshall papers with the final product in the United States Reporter. Another
useful endeavor would have been to look at the more technical areas of the law - securities,
antitrust, and other areas of statutory interpretation - in which the Justices do not always
have a firm grasp of the relevant subject matter, and are more likely to rely on clerks to
formulate legal reasoning. See, e.g., Richard W. Painter et al., Don't Ask, Just Tell: Insider
Trading After United States v. O'Hagan, 84 V A. L. REv. 153 (1998) (criticizing the Court's
confusing and incoherent body of case law governing insider trading). Discussion of cases in
these areas, which go unmentioned in Closed Chambers, might have further supported the
point that clerks' influence is excessive.
8. See Richard W. Painter, A Law Clerk Betrays the Supreme Court, WALL ST. J., Apr. 23,
1998, at A23 (criticizing Lazarus for betraying the Court's confidences); see also Gretchen
Craft Rubin, Betraying a Trust, WASH. PoST, June 17, 1998, at A27 (making same point).
9. See Kozinski, supra note 3, at 838-49. Dean Kronman wrote an endorsement for the
back cover of CLOSED CHAMBERS but has subsequently expressed concern about the serious
and troubling ethical issues raised by Lazarus's reporting of events during his clerkship. See
Letter from Anthony T . Kronman, Dean, Yale Law School, to Richard Painter, Professor,
University of Illinois College of Law (Mar. 26, 1999) (on file with author) ("[I]t is now my
settled view that the only workable rule regarding the disclosure of confidences by law clerks
is one that requires them to treat as confidential (and hence nondisclosable) any information
not in the public record that pertains to events occurring during the period of their clerk
ships-regardless of the source of the information (firsthand or indirect) and regardless of
the time it is received (during the clerkship or after). As the debate surrounding CLOSED
CHAMBERS demonstrates, it is impossible to determine, after the fact, where a clerk who
reveals confidences learned them, and when he or she did. A blanket prohibition against
disclosure seems to me the only sensible approach."). Dean Kronman's written endorsement
of CLOSED CHAMBERS has been withdrawn and will not appear on the paperback edition of
the book. See Tony Mauro, Yale Dean Caught in Book Controversy: Head of Law School
Apologizes for Blurb on High Court Tell-All, USA TODAY, May 10, 1999, at lOA.
10. See Adam Cohen, Courting Controversy, TIME, Mar. 30, 1998, at 31 ("It seems to me
the most fundamental breach of confidentiality you can think of." (quoting Tom Goldstein)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
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To the extent Lazarus disclosed confidential communications
that took place during his clerkship, he breached not only the trust
of the Justices, but a longstanding expectation of confidentiality
that is now embodied in a written Code of Conduct for Supreme
Court Clerks.11 Because portions of the book quote extensively
from nonpublic documents,12 somebody also may have violated fed
eral statutes prohibiting unauthorized removal of documents from
the Supreme Court building.13 Unfortunately, Lazarus darkens the
cloud of suspicion by refusing to reveal his sources, many of whom
are probably former Supreme Court clerks, and by refusing to dis
close where he got the nonpublic documents that he discusses in
Closed Chambers.
These ethical lapses are the principal focus of this review for two
reasons. First, legal scholars, particularly those who teach profes
sional responsibility and recommend students for judicial clerk
ships, need to ascertain the rationale for and extent of a law clerk's
duty of confidentiality. Second, efforts to conceal breaches of that
duty by Lazarus and his sources are responsible for the book's most
significant substantive shortcoming, its lack of verifiability.
Lazarus is loath to disclose his sources, and does not even pro
vide the complete text of documents that he obtained from the
Court's files. His readers, therefore, must take at face value his
representations about what was said or written, by whom, and in
what context. The usual support provided for a scholarly work, ci
tation to specific documents in the public domain or interviews with
identified persons, is absent, and Lazarus acknowledges this weak
ness in his introduction.14 The usual safeguard for journalists' sto
ries in magazines and newspapers, careful scrutiny by fact
checkers,15 presumably was not employed here, and in any event
11. See CODE OF CONDUCT FOR LAW CLERKS OF THE SUPREME CoURT OF THE UNITED
STATES [hereinafter CoDE OF CONDUCT] Canons 2, 3 (1989).
12. See infra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
13. See 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1994) (providing criminal penalties for "[w]hoever embezzles,
steals, purloins, or knowingly converts to his use or the use of another, or without authority,
sells, conveys or disposes of any record .. . of the United States or of any department or
agency thereof," and "[w]hoever receives, conceals, or retains the same with intent to convert
it to his use or gain, knowing it to have been embezzled, stolen, purloined or converted"); 18
U.S.C. § 2071 (1994) (providing criminal penalties for anyone who "willfully and unlawfully
conceals, removes . . . or, with intent to do so takes and carries away any record . . . docu
ment, or other thing, filed or deposited with any clerk or officer of any court of the United
States, or in any public office, or with any judicial or public officer of the United States").
These statutes are discussed infra in text accompanying notes 40-43.
14. P. xii ("I recognize that this approach makes it more difficult for the reader to evalu
ate some of my assertions, but I have made this sacrifice in order to further shield the identity
of those who helped me.").
15. Recent high-profile fabrication incidents have highlighted the need for this safeguard.
See Robin Pogrebin, Columnist's Ouster Pushes Editors to Look Inward, N.Y. TIMES, June
22, 1998, at D7 (discussing impact of the Boston Globe columnist Patricia Smith's resignation
because of fabricated stories); Robin Pogrebin, Rechecking a Writer's Facts, A Magazine Un-
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would not have been successful given Lazarus's reliance on so many
anonymous sources. Indeed, it is unlikely that anyone other than
Lazarus himself has comprehensive knowledge of the sources he
used.
Finally, Lazarus's breach of confidence raises an unsettling
question that undermines his work's credibility: If Lazarus and his
sources betrayed the Justices' trust, how can readers easily dismiss
the possibility of fabrication somewhere along his undisclosed chain
of information? Under the circumstances, and given the substan
tive inaccuracies that other reviewers have already identified in the
book,16 this reviewer finds such a leap of faith to be unfathomable.
Part I of this review discusses specific ways in which the author
and his sources breached confidence. Section I.D responds to the
author's arguments in defense of his enterprise. Sections LE, F,
and G then discuss how these disclosures undermine rather than
enhance the substantive merits of Closed Chambers, and conclude
that those portions of the book that rely on the public record are
the strongest while the portions that rely on insiders' disclosures are
the weakest. Lazarus's recounting of confidential communications
adds little to his account, and his obsession with the clerks rather
than the Justices themselves is a distraction that undermines what
could have been an insightful account of an important juncture in
the Court's history.
Part II discusses the relationship between Justice and law clerk
and the importance of confidentiality to that relationship. Part II
also addresses an argument that is sometimes made for narrowly
construing the duty of confidentiality in the Justice-clerk relation
ship: the importance of scholarly and public scrutiny of the
Supreme Court.17 Ultimately, however, this argument is unpersua
sive, in part because substantial damage to the Justice-clerk rela
tionship ensues from such breaches of confidence, and in part
because there is relatively little value in selective disclosures by for
mer clerks. Disclosures about the Court's decisionmaking process
are better made by the Justices themselves, as when they give or
covers Fiction, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1998, at Al (recounting how writer Stephen Glass was
fired when the New Republic discovered that he made up part or all of 27 of 41 articles over

three years).
16. See supra note 3.
17. See Cohen, supra note 10, at 31 (quoting Erwin Chemerinsky, Professor of Law at the
University of Southern California and a friend of Lazarus, as saying that back-room politics
that affect case outcomes is "exactly what should be exposed to the public"). Professor
Chemerinsky has written a review of CLOSED CHAMBERS that is more positive than most
other reviews of the book, and that is devoted in susbstantial part to refuting claims made by
Judge Kozinski and the author of this review that the book improperly breaches confidences
and relies upon improperly obtained documents. See Erwin Chemerinsky,.Opening CLOSED
CHAMBERS, 108 YALE L.J.1087 {1999).
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bequest their papers to libraries or engage in cooperative endeavors
with biographers.
I. CLOSED CHAMBERS
A.

The Breaches of Confidence

Lazarus begins his book acknowledging that "[t]he clerkship
gave me unusual access to sources knowledgeable about the Court
and armed me with questions others might not think to ask" (p. xi).
He goes on to insist, however, that
I have been careful to avoid disclosing information I am privy to
solely because I was privileged to work for Justice Blackmun. In
other words, I have reconstructed what I knew and supplemented that
knowledge through primary sources (either publicly available or pro

vided by others) and dozens of interviews conducted over the past
five years.18

In addition, in various public statements, but not in the book itself,
Lazarus has claimed that Justice Blackmun knew about the book
while it was being written.19 Justice Blackmun, who died a year
after the book's publication, did not confirm or deny prior knowl
edge of the book, although persons in his office denied that he
knew about it prior to publication.20 There is no evidence that Jus
tice Blackmun gave Lazarus permission to use confidential commu
nications in writing the book, and Lazarus himself acknowledges
that Justice Blackmun was unaware of the details of the book.21
Unfortunately, portions of Closed Chambers directly repudiate
Lazarus's claim that he has not disclosed information he was privy
18. P. xi (emphasis added). As Judge Kozinski points out, "The word 'solely' is empha
sized because it is crucial to Lazarus's ethical hairsplitting. Lazarus takes the position that he
did not breach any confidences because all the inside information he discloses, he learned or relearned - after he left the Court." Kozinski, supra note 3, at 838. In a later editorial,
Lazarus claims that he "omitted from my book matters I knew only because I served as a
clerk (including every discussion I had with my boss, Justice Blackmun)." Edward Lazarus,
The Supreme Court Must Bear Scrutiny, WASH. PosT, July 6, 1998, at A19. At least with
respect to Lazarus's conversations with Justice Blackmun, this claim is demonstrably false.
See infra text accompanying notes 22-24.
19. See Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, The Interview with Edward Lazarus,
J U R I S T: B o o Ks-oN-LAw ( M a y 1 9 9 8 ) < h t t p:// j u r i s t .l a w .p i t t . e d u/ la w b o o ks/
revmay98.htm#'Ii'ans> [hereinafter Collins & Skover, Interview with Lazarus] ("Justice
Blackmun has known since the book's inception that I was writing it, and we discussed the
book and corresponded about it on many occasions."). The exact moment of the book's
"inception" is unclear, although Lazarus claims to have been inspired to write the book dur
ing the confirmation hearings for Justice Thomas. See id.
20. See Joan Biskupic, Book Breaks Silence ofSupreme Court, WASH. PoST, Mar. 4, 1998,
at AS ("Blackmun retired in 1994 but still goes daily to his office at the court and some
people close to him said he was unaware until yesterday that his former clerk was publishing
a book."). Despite protestations to the contrary by Lazarus, see Collins & Skover, Interview
with Lazarus, supra note 19, The Washington Post has not retracted this story.
21. See Collins & Skover, Interview with Lazarus, supra note 19 ("I never discussed with
the Justice the intimate details of the book, and he was not a source for the book.").

Michigan Law Review

1438

[Vol.

97:1430

to solely because of his clerkship.22 Lazarus reports that early in his
clerkship he had a telephone conversation with Blackmun in which
he advised Blackmun how to vote in a case, and that Blackmun
took Lazarus's advice:

I told Blackmun that I thought [Justice] Marshall's dissent [from the
stay in Spallone v. United States, 487 U.S. 125 (1988)], though fairly
convincing, felt premature to me and also prejudged some legal issues
. . . . We talked for a while, back and forth, question and answer ....
In the end, the Justice chose not to join Marshall's dissent. [p. 46]
Lazarus also reveals that as a clerk for Justice Blackmun, he was
given "exacting instructions about how to handle the emergency
death cases, including explicit warnings not to be overly influenced
by abolitionists from the Brennan or Marshall chambers" (p. 269).
Later in the book, Lazarus discusses Justice Blackmun's reaction to
the conference in which the Justices decided which issues to hear in
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,23 then quotes from a
bench memo he wrote to Blackmun about Webster (pp. 395-96), and
finally relates Blackmun's tepid reaction to the Justices' conference
on the merits of Webster. 24
Lazarus's disclosure of his own conversations and correspon
dence with Justice Blackmun, however, is less significant than his
reports about communications between other clerks and their Jus
tices. Lazarus may have overheard some of these communications
when he was at the Court. In many instances, however, other clerks
may have told Lazarus about their own communications with their
Justices. In still other instances Lazarus's account may be based on
second- and third-hand reports of what clerks remember having
overheard. Because Lazarus does not identify his sources, there is
no way for the reader to tell which is which.
For example, Lazarus gives a detailed account of a meeting be
tween Justice Kennedy and two of his clerks, Paul Cappuccio, for
merly a Scalia clerk, and Harry Litman, formerly a Marshall clerk,
in which the two "vied for his critical vote" in Webster "with abso
lute abandon":

Cappuccio, much like McBride in O'Connor's Chambers, pressed for
Kennedy to overturn Roe and adopt Scalia's Michael H. approach to
due process. Over and over, Cappuccio reminded Kennedy that the
Court's foray into Roe style substantive due process had originated in
-

22. Lazarus also discusses his initial interview with Justice Blackmun. In the interview,
Blackmun "asked me how I would feel about working for the man who had written Roe." P.
334. Justice Blackmun also "insisted that his was the least desirable clerkship at the Court, in
part because his colleagues were more intelligent and better teachers than he." P. 23.
23. See p. 334 ("I still remember Justice Blackmun telling us about the conference vote,
his face impassive, his voice wavering between defiance and resignation.").
24. See p. 401 ("In any event, I stayed in my office and waited for Blackmun to come
through my door on the way to his own. I caught his eye as he slipped quietly by, and he
gave a little shake of his head, then whispered, 'We'll see."').
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the abomination of Dred Scott....Cappuccio insisted that substantive
due process - as evident from both Dred Scott and Roe - was a
doctrine that corrupted law with political judgment. Accordingly,
overturning Roe was not only proper but imperative.
On the other side, Litman's argument focused on the conse
quences of overruling Roe. As a jurisprudential matter, Litman sug
gested that there could be no meaningful line drawn between Roe and
Griswold, the contraception case Kennedy had referred to approv
ingly at his confirmation hearings. Both decisions were based on the
same elastic Harlanesque concept of due process and, indeed, relied
on many of the same precedents.... [L]ogically, dumping Roe meant
dumping Griswold and everything in between.
The meeting was among the most dramatic of the term, a tug-of
war for Kennedy's mind, conducted by two of the Court's smartest
and fastest-thinking clerks (who notably, were also good friends).
Still with oral argument upon them, the discussion ended inconclu
sively. [pp. 394-95]

Lazarus himself could not have witnessed what was said at this pri
vate discussion between Justice Kennedy and his clerks.25 Nor is
the discussion a matter of public record in the Brennan or Marshall
papers, or anywhere else. Lazarus could have learned about the
discussion from a Kennedy clerk who was present, or from some
one else who overheard the discussion or heard about it from some
one who was present. If so, someone breached Justice Kennedy's
confidence in order for Lazarus to learn what was said. Alterna
tively, someone may have made this discussion up.26 Breach of
confidence, fabrication, or perhaps a little of both, underlies
Lazarus's account, but without disclosure of his sources, we have no
way of knowing what was said and whether confidences were
breached. What we do know is that any such discussion between
Justice Kennedy and his clerks, if it occurred, almost certainly was
intended to be confidential.
With respect to the documents that Lazarus used to write the
book, he initially represents that his sources are the publicly avail
able Brennan and Marshall papers "[u]nless otherwise noted" (p.
xi, n.*). However, in discussing Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services, Lazarus explicitly claims to be using documents, including
a draft opinion purportedly written by the Chief Justice, that are
not part of the public record:
25. Lazarus claims not to have known about goings on in Justice Kennedy's chambers at
the time: "In the Blackmun Chambers, I remember having only a relatively vague sense of
the tempest brewing in these decisive quarters." P. 395.

26. It is also possible that Lazarus reconstructed the argument from bench memoranda
obtained from the Kennedy chambers, in which case there may have been no actual conver
sation at all.
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Previous "insider" accounts of Webster have made no mention of this
draft or the crucial correspondence that followed it. They pieced to
gether their versions of the story based mainly on the Thurgood
Marshall or William Brennan Papers, neither of which, for obvious
reasons, contain the private letters sent within the conservative caucus
of the Rehnquist Court. Webster is only one example, albeit a glaring
one, of how dramatically the presently available paper trail can seri
ously mislead students of the Court. [p. 402 n. *]

Lazarus thus goes beyond "the presently available paper trail" to
discuss a draft opinion and "crucial correspondence" that some
body obtained from the Court's confidential files. Lazarus also
cites and discusses a post-conference letter on Webster from
Kennedy to Rehnquist that is not a part of the public record:
Other commentators have suggested that Kennedy's position was less
firm in rejecting Roe: for example, that while disapproving of Roe he
favored standing by the decision because of stare decisis concerns.
See James Simon, The Center Holds: The Power Struggle Inside the
Rehnquist Court (New York, Simon & Schuster, 1995) pp. 135-36.
This is an error, and an important one given the key role Kennedy
subsequently played in preserving Roe in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey. As Kennedy characterized his own view in a postconference
letter to Rehnquist, he explicitly favored overturning Roe. Past com
mentators have been misled at least in part by the fact that the con
firming Kennedy letter does not appear in the Thurgood Marshall
Papers because, as with other telling correspondence, it was circulated
only to the Court's conservatives. [p. 400 n. *]

Lazarus insists that he knew nothing about these documents when
he clerked for the Court the year Webster was decided.27 Once
again, however, his refusal to identify his sources makes his state
ments in his own defense impossible to verify.
How did Lazarus, years after his clerkship, examine documents
that he acknowledges are still not available to the public? If he did
not remove the documents from the Court during his clerkship, two
other possibilities remain: either someone permitted him to enter
the building to review these documents after his clerkship was over
(an unlikely possibility) or someone removed the documents from
the Court and allowed Lazarus to examine them. In either case, the
27. See Collins & Skover, Interview with Lazarus, supra note 19 ("I didn't know, for ex
ample, that the conservative Justices in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services were caucus
ing behind the backs of the liberals, and circulating internal drafts that the liberals never saw
on it, and that never made it into the Marshall papers. I learned that years after I left the
Court. So, obviously, I'm not breaking any ethical obligation of mine by publishing that in a
book."). Professor Chemerinsky in his review raises the possibility that Lazarus never saw
the documents in question but reconstructed them from interviews with "[i)ndividuals with
strong recollections of the documents." Chemerinsky, supra note 17, at 1101. This, however,
is very unlikely given the detailed paraphasing and extensive quotation from these docu
ments in Closed Chambers. Furthermore, even after the removal of these documents was
raised by the author of this review, see Painter, supra note 8, Lazarus has not denied having
seen the documents and refuses to elaborate on how he came to know of their contents.

Clerk Confidentiality

May 1999]

1441

conduct in question could have been authorized by one of the Jus
tices. Lazarus himself, however, points out that these documents
existed only in the files of the conservative Justices (pp. 400, 402),
making authorization for their use in a book by a former clerk to
Justice Blackmun, the author of Roe v. Wade, very unlikely.28
Other portions of the book appear to be based on written mem
oranda and e-mail communications taken by somebody, or by sev
eral persons, from the Supreme Court building.29 Once again, it is
possible that a Justice authorized their removal. If, however, there
was no authorization, the same issues as with the Webster papers
come to the fore. Were these materials removed from the Supreme
Court without authorization and, if so, by whom?
B.

The Code of Conduct

In March 1989, during Lazarus's clerkship, the Supreme Court
promulgated a Code of Conduct for Supreme Court Clerks.3° Ca
non 1 of the Code provides that "[a] law clerk should observe high
standards of conduct so that the integrity and independence of the
judiciary may be preserved" and that "[t]he provisions of this Code
should be construed and applied to further that objective."31 Ca
non 2 provides that a "law clerk owes the Justice and the Court
28. Speculation has focused on the chambers of Justice O'Connor, several of whose
clerks from the 1 988-89 term are featured prominently in the book. See Garrow, supra note 3
(stating that Lazarus's account of Webster is based "upon copies of documents obtained from
O'Connor's file"). Of the O'Connor clerks, one, Daniel Mandi!, "had primary responsibility
for the case." P. 391.
29. See, e.g., p. 265 (quoting an e-mail from Andrew McBride to his fellow conservatives
in mid-September 1988, as stating "Every time I draw blood I'll think of what they did to
Robert H. Bork"); p. 269 (quoting and identifying the exact date of a cabal member's exhor
tation to his comrades to increase the number of successful executions, but not disclosing the
medium of communication used to relay this message); see also Letter from Judge Alex
Kozinski to Edward Lazarus (Sept. 1 6, 1998) (on file with author) (requesting copies of docu
ments referred to in Closed Chambers but apparently unavailable in the Marshall Papers or
in any other public source, including:
1) All correspondence between Justice Kennedy and other Justices in Patterson v. Mc
Lean Credit Union; in particular, all correspondence between Justices Kennedy and
Brennan. Pages 309-12.
2) With respect to Tompkins v. Texas, a copy of Justice Kennedy's memo explaining his
switch on the Batson issue and any other documents written by Justice Kennedy ex
plaining his views of this case. Pages 67-68.
3) Andrew McBride's memo regarding Teague v. Lane. Pages 499-502.
4) The memos written by Justice O'Connor's clerks espousing competing views of how
Webster should be decided. Pages 390-94.
5) Chief Justice Rehnquist's draft of the Webster opinion and the correspondence
among the Justices regarding this draft. Pages 402-07, 423.
6) Justice Kennedy's letter to Chief Justice Rehnquist [about Webster] .
7) The Court's internal correspondence concerning Planned Parenthood v. Casey. Pages

462-81.).
30. CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 11.
31. CooE OF CoNDucr, supra note 11, Canon 1.
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complete confidentiality, accuracy and loyalty,"32 and that "[t]he
Justice relies on confidentiality in discussing performance of judicial
duties."33 Canon 2 also states that each law clerk "is in a position to
receive highly confidential circulations from the chambers of other
Justices, and owes a duty of confidentiality with respect to such ma
terial similar to the duty owed to the Justice employing the clerk."
Canon 3 reiterates that the "relationship between Justice and law
clerk is essentially a confidential one" and provides that "[a] law
clerk should never disclose to any person any confidential informa
tion received in the course of the law clerk's duties, nor should the
law clerk employ such information for personal gain."34 Canon 3
also states specifically that " [t]he law clerk should take particular
care that Court documents not available to the public are not taken
from the Court building or handled so as to compromise their confi
dentiality within chambers or the Court building in general."35
In 1981, the Judicial Conference of the United States promul
gated a Code of Conduct for Law Clerks,36 and in 1996 a Code of
Conduct for Judicial Employees37 which applies to clerks and other
employees of the Judicial Branch other than employees of the
Supreme Court. The Code of Conduct for Judicial Employees man
dates confidentiality,38 and more explicitly states a point that is also
obvious from any fair construction of the Supreme Court's Code:
"A former judicial employee should observe the same restrictions
on disclosure of confidential information that apply to a current ju
dicial employee."39
C.

Federal Statutes

Unauthorized removal and use of documents from the Court's
files are governed not only by the Supreme Court's Code of Con32. CoDE OF CONDUCT, supra note 11, Canon 2. Canon 2 later states that "[s]eparate
and apart from the duty owed by each law clerk to the appointing Justice is the duty owed by
each law clerk to the Court as a body."
33. CoDE OF CoNDuCT, supra note 11, Canon 2. The Code explicitly analogizes the rela
tionship between Justice and law clerk to a relationship between two lawyers: "The relation
ship between the Justice and the law clerk has several facets: employer-employee, teacher
student, and lawyer-lawyer." CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 11, Canon 2.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

CoDE OF CONDUCT,
CODE OF CONDUCT,

supra note 11, Canon 3.
supra note 11, Canon 3.

CoDE OF CoNDuCT FOR LAW CLERKS (Jud.Conf.of the United States

1981).

CODE OF CoNDuCT FOR JuorcIAL EMPLOYEES (Jud.Conf.of the United States 1996).

CoDE OF CoNDUCT FOR JUDICIAL EMPLOYEES, supra note 37, Canon 3(D) ("A judi
cial employee should never disclose any confidential information received in the course of
official duties ...nor should a judicial employee employ such information for personal
gain.)
" .

39. CoDE OF CoNDuCT FOR JUDICIAL EMPLOYEES, supra note 37, Canon 3(D). Lazarus
has argued to the contrary that the Supreme Court's Code does not require a clerk to keep
the confidences of the Justices once the clerkship is over.See infra text accompanying notes
51-55.
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duct, but also by the United States criminal code. 18 U.S.C. § 641
provides criminal penalties for "[w]hoever embezzles, steals, pur
loins, or knowingly converts to his use or the use of another, or
without authority, sells, conveys or disposes of any record . . . or
thing of value of the United States or of any department or agency
thereof," and "[w]hoever receives, conceals, or retains the same
with intent to convert it to his use or gain knowing it to have been
embezzled, stolen, purloined or converted." Government employ
ees have been convicted under this provision for unauthorized pho
tocopying and dissemination of confidential documents.40 18
U.S.C. § 2071 provides criminal penalties for anyone who "willfuly
l
and unlawfully conceals, removes . . . or, with intent to do so takes
and carries away any record . . . paper, document, or other thing,
filed or deposited with any clerk or officer of any court of the
United States, or in any public office, or with any judicial or public
officer of the United States . . . . " On their face, these statutes ap
pear to prohibit unauthorized removal of confidential records from
a federal court, although the few courts that have interpreted
section 2071 have limited its application to mutilation, destruc
tion, or permanent removal of documents, while section 641
has broader applications.41 Both of these statutes are explicitly
40. See United States v. DiGilio, 538 F.2d 972, 977 (3d Cir. 1976) (holding that a file
clerk's unauthorized photocopying of confidential documents in FBI office constituted a vio
lation of the statute) ("A duplicate copy is a record for purposes of the statute, and duplicate
copies belonging to the government were stolen."); see also United States v. McAusland, 979
F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1003 (1993) (statute not unconstitutionally
vague when applied to unauthorized disclosure of government bid information); United
States v. Jeter, 775 F.2d 670 (6th Cir. 1985) (convicting defendant under § 641 for acquiring
carbon papers used in typing secret grand jury transcripts and passing the information con
tained therein to grand jury targets, even though the government did not lose possession of
informational property); United States v. Jones, 677 F. Supp. 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding
statute not unconstitutionally vague when applied to unauthorized sale of nonpublic informa
tion that the defendant overheard concerning a federal criminal investigation). Several cases
have reserved for future decision the issue of whether § 641 would be constitutional in a
"Pentagon Papers scenario" where information is leaked to a newspaper for public consump
tion. See Jeter 775 F.2d at 682; Jones, 677 F. Supp. at 242 n.5. But see United States v. Mori
son, 844 F.2d 1057, 1060-62, 1076-77 (4th Cir. 1988) (military intelligence employee convicted
under § 641 for unauthorized transmittal of satellite-secured photographs to a British period
ical, even though the defendant contended that he did not steal the photographs for private
use but in order to give them to the press for public dissemination and information). For a
criticism of the government's use of § 641 in the Pentagon Papers case, see generally Melville
B. Nimmer, National Security Secrets v. Free Speech: The Issues Left Undecided in the Ell
sberg Case, 26 STAN. L. REv. 311, 315-23 (1974). Even if § 641 were found to be constitution
ally overbroad when used to criminally prosecute persons who gratuitously "leak"
information or even documents to the press, such leaks are distinguishable from the situation
in which a former government employee receives royalties from a book that he himself wrote
based on documents that were removed from his government employer's files without
authorization.
41. See, e.g., Martin v. United States, 168 F. 198 (8th Cir. 1909) (holding that § 2071 did
not apply to defendant's hand copying from a roll of Indian tribe members that was kept in a
government office vault); United States v. Rosner, 352 F. Supp. 915, 919-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)
(examining the legislative history and "previous application" of § 2071 and concluding that it
would only apply to permanent mutilation, destruction, or removal of documents). The Ian-
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cited at the beginning of the Code of Conduct for Judicial
Employees.42
First Amendment concerns would complicate, although proba
bly not prevent, prosecution of a clerk who removed documents
from the Court's files and gave them to the press or to a person
writing about the Court. Admittedly, it would be difficult to pre
vent the publication by a newspaper or author of documents ob
tained in violation of these statutes,43 but limitations on prior
restraint do not necessarily bar prosecution of the perpetrator. The
most significant obstacle to such a prosecution is that the perpetra
tor cannot be identified if the recipient of the purloined documents
is permitted to refuse to disclose his sources.
The feasibility of prosecution or prior restraint, however, is not
the point when it comes to evaluating whether conduct is legal and
ethical, particularly when one or more perpetrators are now mem
bers of the bar entrusted with, among other things, confidential
documents from their clients. It makes matters worse if the person
who uses purloined documents in a book is a federal prosecutor
who could now be entrusted with yet more confidential information
by the United States government. While journalists sometimes re
fuse to reveal their sources, prosecutors are charged with upholding
the law, not with concealing possible violations of the law.44
D.
of

Arguments and Responses

Both in television and radio interviews following publication
Closed Chambers45 and in a letter to the Wall Street

guage of § 2071, however, like § 641, does not explicitly limit the statute's reach to original
documents, and the construction of the statute in Rosner acknowledged that "legislative his
tory is almost wholly lacking." See 352 F. Supp. at 919. The Rosner court furthermore
pointed out that had the defendants in that case been indicted under § 641, the government's
reasoning with respect to unauthorized photocopying of government records "would [have
been] fully applicable." See 352 F. Supp. at 922; see also supra note 40 (case law applying
§ 641 to copies of government documents as well as originals). Some of the correspondence
removed from the Supreme Court and relied upon in Closed Chambers could have been
original copies, in which case both § 641 and § 2071 would apply. There is simply no way of
knowing unless Lazarus opens his files for inspection.

42. CooE oF CoNDucr FOR JUDICIAL EMPLOYEES, supra note 37, Canon 3(A)
43. See New York Ttmes Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (holding that prior
.

restraint on newspaper's publication of excerpts of confidential Pentagon papers concerning
the conduct of the Vietnam War required the government to meet a heavy burden of showing
justification, and that the government had not met that burden). See also supra note 40
(discussing unresolved constitutional issues that would arise in a prosecution of the
perpetrator).
44. The different ethical standards observed by lawyers and journalists are discussed infra
in the text accompanying notes 126-36.

45. See, e.g., The Today Show (NBC television broadcast, Apr. 8, 1998) (interview with
Edward Lazarus by Katie Courie); CBS News, The Osgood File (television broadcast, June
15, 1998) (interview with Edward Lazarus by Charles Osgood); McNeil-Lehrer Productions,
The News Hour with Jim Lehrer (PBS television broadcast, June 15, 1998) (dialogue between
David Gergen and Edward Lazarus).
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Journal, 46

Lazarus has defended himself against the charge that he
breached a confidential relationship that he had with the Justices of
the Supreme Court. He has made the following arguments in de
fense of Closed Chambers. After each, a response follows.

1. Argument: Closed Chambers Merely "Reconstructs"
Information Learned in Confidential Communications.47
Lazarus stands on weak ground when he claims that he may re
veal a confidence that he reconstructed from other unnamed
sources. First, Lazarus's knowledge of confidential information
makes the act of reconstruction easy and thus the distinction be
tween reconstruction and direct revelation mostly academic. Sec
ond, Lazarus's unwillingness to disclose the sources from which he
"reconstructed" makes his claim that he used a source other than
himself impossible to verify. Finally, such a distinction has little
grounding in the law governing confidential communications. The
Model Code of Professional Responsibility, for example, specifi
cally points out that a lawyer's ethical obligation to keep the confi
dences of a client "exists without regard to the nature or source of
information or the fact that others share the knowledge."48 The
Comment to ABA Model Rule 1.6 likewise states that the confiden
tiality rule applies to "all information relating to the representation,
whatever its source."49 Allowing a lawyer to reveal his client's con
fidences by using his inside knowledge to squeeze the same infor
mation from other sources would eviscerate the lawyer-client
relationship. The relationship between Justices and their clerks
would be similarly destroyed if clerks could so easily circumvent
their obligation to keep confidences.50
46. Edward Lazarus, Letter to the Editor, WALL ST. J., Apr. 23, 1998, at A19.
47. See p. xi ("I have reconstructed what I knew and supplemented that knowledge
through primary sources (either publicly available or provided by others) and dozens of
interviews conducted over the last five years."); see also Collins & Skover, Interview with
Lazarus, supra note 19 ("I'm quite explicit in my book that I think that being a former clerk
helped my book in any number of ways; that maybe people were more likely to talk to me, I
think it's quite possible. But, even more than that, I knew how to read the paper trail; I knew
what questions to ask . . . . ).
48. MODEL CoDE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPoNSIBILITY [hereinafter MODEL CODE] E C 4-4
(amended 1989).
49. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT [hereinafter MODEL RuLES] Rule 1.6
cmt. 5 (1993).
50. By analogy, federal insider trading laws do not permit a person with inside informa
tion about a company to trade in the company's securities simply because the trader "recon
structed" the information from other nonpublic sources besides herself, particularly if these
sources were themselves breaching a duty to the issuer or its security holders. See Dirks v.
SE C, 463 U.S. 646, 660 (1983) (holding that a tippee can be liable for trading on material
nonpublic information while knowing that his tipper breached a duty by disclosing the infor
mation to him).
"
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2. Argument: The Confidentiality Provisions of the Code of
Conduct Do Not Apply to Former Clerks.
The Code of Conduct for Supreme Court Clerks, Canon 3, pro
vides that "a law clerk should never disclose to any person any con
fidential information received in the course of the law clerk's
duties, nor should the law clerk employ such information for per
sonal gain." Presumably the word "never" in Canon 3 means what
it says, and it would defeat the Code's purpose to argue that a law
clerk is no longer bound by these Canons and may reveal confiden
tial information after his clerkship ends.
Lazarus, however, in his comments to Time,51 in a letter to The
and in an editorial in The Washington Post, 53
has stated that the Code of Conduct no longer applies to him. To
prove this point, he seizes upon its last provision:
Effective Date of Compliance A person to whom this Code becomes

Wall Street Journal, 52

applicable shall comply with it immediately upon commencement of
his or her clerkship and throughout such clerkship. Violations of the
Code by a law clerk may be disciplined by his or her appointing Jus
tice, including dismissaJ.54
Lazarus argues that the confidentiality provisions in Canon 2 and
Canon 3, like other provisions of the Code, therefore "appl[y] to
clerks only during their service at the court (not to former clerks
who routinely talk to the press). This is why the explicit penalty for
Code violations is limited to dismissal as a clerk."55 Lazarus, how
ever, fails to name a single former Supreme Court clerk (besides
himself) "who routinely talk[s] to the press" about the Court's con
fidences. Furthermore, his attempt to turn the "Effective Date of
Compliance" clause into a release from the Code's confidentiality
provisions fails.
First, the mere fact that a clerk can no longer be fired by a Jus
tice does not mean that the clerk is permitted to violate his ethical
obligation of confidentiality to the Court. The plain purpose of the
"Effective Date of Compliance" provision in the Code is to estab
lish when and how the Court will discipline a clerk for a violation,
not to relieve clerks of their duty to keep confidences as soon as
51. See Cohen, supra note 10, at 31 ("Lazarus argues [the confidentiality provision of the
Code] applies only when a clerk is actually employed by the Justice.").
52.
53.

Lazarus,

supra note 46, at A19 (responding to Painter).

Lazarus, supra note 18, at A19 ("[T]he Law Clerk Code of Conduct, including its
confidentiality provision, applies only to clerks during their time at the court (to protect
deliberation on pending and impending cases) and has no bearing on the propriety of a for
mer clerk writing a book.").

54. CooE OF CoNDucr, supra note 11, Canon 6, quoted in Lazarus, supra note 18, at A19,
and Lazarus, supra note 46, at A19.
55. Lazarus, supra note 46, at A19. Professor Chemerinsky makes a similar argument.
See Chemerinsky, supra note 17, at 107.
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they move on to a new job. By analogy, a lawyer has an obligation
to keep the confidences of his clients, and ending a lawyer-client
relationship or even moving to another jurisdiction hardly permits
the lawyer to disclose those confidences.56 Even if the lawyer can
no longer be punished for breach of professional conduct rules in
the former jurisdiction, the second jurisdiction may punish the
breach. More importantly, the lawyer has acted unethically. In like
manner, the Court's relinquishment of the power to discipline a
clerk at the conclusion of his clerkship does not automatically re
lease the clerk from all ethical obligations he might otherwise have
to the Court.
Second, the "Effective Date of Compliance" provision affirma
tively states when a clerk must comply with the Code in its entirety,
including provisions such as the one (immediately above it on the
same page) stating that a clerk should not seek political office.57
Nowhere does the Code indicate when a clerk's obligation to obey
the Code shall cease. Common sense suggests that many of the
Code's obligations (such as not to run for political office) do expire
with the clerkship. Common sense also tells us, however, that a
confidential relationship, whether it be lawyer-client, doctor-pa
tient, priest-penitent, or any other, would not exist if confidences
could be breached as soon as the relationship is over. Lazarus's
construction of the Code simply defies logic.
Finally, construing the "Effective Date of Compliance" provi
sion as a release of the confidentiality obligation upon termination
of a clerkship creates a glaring conflict with the language of unlim
ited duration (the word "never") that is used in Canon 3 to state
when a clerk may disclose the Court's confidences. Indeed, the
56. See MooEL RULES, supra note 49, Rule 1.6 cmt. 21 ("The duty of confidentiality
continues after the client-lawyer relationship has terminated."). The Justice-clerk relation
ship is in many ways similar to the relationship of a client and lawyer, particularly that of a
government official and the government lawyer he consults in order to carry out the duties of
public office. The Justice has the power to hire and fire the clerk, much as the client has the
power to hire and fire the lawyer. The Justice relies on the clerk for advice about the law,
much as the client relies on the lawyer for advice. The clerk must avoid political or other
obligations which conflict \vith the clerk's duties to the Justice, much as the lawyer must
avoid representing clients with conflicting interests. Finally, and most importantly for the
present analysis, the Justice expects the law clerk not to disclose her confidences without her
permission, much as the client expects her lawyer to keep her confidences. The Justice and
client both engage in free and frank discussion when seeking advice from the law clerk and
lawyer respectively because this duty of confidentiality protects what they say from being
disclosed \vithout their permission. There are some differences between the two relation
ships, the most important being that the clerk is not the legal representative of the Justice as
the lawyer is the legal representative of the client. The clerk thus does not enter appear
ances, take depositions, file pleadings, or carry out other representative functions on behalf
of the Justice. These differences have little bearing, however, on the value of confidentiality
to the relationship, and insofar as the duty of confidentiality and its underlying rationale are
concerned, the analogy between the Justice-clerk and client-lawyer relationships is an apt
one.

57. See

CooE

OF CoNDucr, supra

note 11, Canon

6.
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Code of Conduct for Judicial Employees promulgated by the Judi
cial Conference of the United States, and applicable to every fed
eral law clerk outside the Supreme Court, makes this point even
more explicit: "A former judicial employee should observe the
same restrictions on disclosure of confidential information that ap
ply to a current judicial employee. "58 Lazarus apparently is arguing
that if a Court of Appeals clerk later clerks for the Supreme Court,
the clerk may, as soon as his clerkship is over, publicly discuss de
tails of how the Justices decided a case and need only keep the con
fidences of the judges who decided the case below. Lazarus is too
intelligent actually to believe an argument so absurd.

3. Argument: There Is No Basis for the Suspicion That Closed
Chambers Uses Documents That Were Illegally Removed
from the Supreme Court Building. 59
Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct prohibits removal by a clerk of
documents from the Court,60 and the United States Code prohibits
unauthorized removal and use of records from a federal court.61
There is no conclusive proof that the nonpublic documents used in
Closed Chambers were removed from the courthouse without au
thorization. Lazarus's repeated reliance on such documents, how
ever, coupled with his refusal to disclose their source, warrants
serious concern. This refusal makes it difficult to confirm or dispel
the suspicion of misuse, and if documents were removed from the
Court without authorization, we cannot tell who the culprit was.
Nonetheless, even if Lazarus did not personally take the Chief
Justice's draft opinion in Webster and related correspondence out of
the courthouse, it is still important to determine how he got them.
A lawyer should not use illegally purloined material in writing a
book any more than in preparing a case,62 and now that he is a
federal prosecutor, Lazarus should have taken care to make certain
that nobody violated the Code of Conduct or any provision of the
federal criminal code by providing him with documents. The au
thor of this review has sought assurance from Lazarus that none of
the nonpublic documents discussed in Closed Chambers was re58. CoDE OF CONDUCT FOR JUDICIAL EMPLOYEES, supra note 37, Canon 3(D).
59. See Lazarus, supra note 46, at Al9 (calling "outrageous and false" the charge that he
may have misused government documents).
60. See CoDE OF CONDUCT, supra note 11, Canon 3.
61. See 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1994); 18 U.S.C. § 2071 (1994); supra text accompanying notes
40-44. Although the few courts that have interpreted § 2071 have held that it only applies to
originals of documents, § 641 has repeatedly been applied to copies. See supra note 41 and
accompanying text.
62. See MODEL RULES, supra note 49, Rule 4.4 (stating that an attorney shall not "use
methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of [another] person"); Rule 4.4
cmt. ("It is impractical to catalogue all such rights, but they include legal restrictions on
methods of obtaining evidence from third persons.").
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moved from the Supreme Court without authorization, but Lazarus
has given no such assurance and, in particular, refuses to discuss
where he examined the draft opinions and correspondence in Web
ster. 63 Lazarus claims that he did not see these documents when he
clerked for the Court the year Webster was decided,64 but he will
not disclose who apparently gave him access to these documents
years later.65 His willingness to discuss the secrets of the Court
stands in stark contrast to his reticence about his sources.
E.

Anonymity, .Verifiability, and Credibility

Although not the principal focus of this review, the substantive
merit of Closed Chambers is worthy of some discussion, at least in
sofar as it benefited or suffered from use of confidential communi
cations. From the standpoint of the book's quality alone, were the
breaches of trust that went into it worthwhile?
The answer appears to be "no." Apart from the Chief Justice's
draft opinion and the memoranda he exchanged with other con
servative Justices in Webster (pp. 466-69), and perhaps some of the
memoranda exchanged among the Justices in Planned Parenthood
v. Casey (pp. 484-86) and Patterson v. McLean Credit Union (pp.
309-12), Lazarus has uncovered little new documentary material.66
The nonpublic documents that Lazarus does disclose for the· first
time have little value, because he selectively quotes and para
phrases without reprinting them in an appendix or completely dis
closing when they were written, to whom they were circulated, and
the complete subject matter discussed therein. For scholars of the
Court, Lazarus's documentary disclosure will be paltry and
unilluminating.67
Lazarus has, however, disclosed, or at least alleged, a significant
amount of information that might embarrass the Justices. The book
tells us that Justice Stevens was away in Florida so often that he
63. See Telephone Interview with Edward Lazarus (Apr. 8, 1998) [hereinafter Telephone
Interview with Lazarus].
64. See id.; Collins & Skover, Interview with Lazarus, supra note 19.
65. See Telephone Interview with Lazarus, supra note 63.
66. Justice Brennan's draft opinions in Patterson y. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164
(1989), are discussed, pp. 310-24, but presumably are also included in Justice Brennan's pub
licly available papers. A portion of Justice Kennedy's correspondence with other Justices
about Patterson, however, may not be publicly available, although it is discussed in Closed
Chambers. See Letter from Judge Alex Kozinski to Edward Lazarus, supra note 29. Justice
Stevens's draft opinion in Tompkins v. Texas, 490 U.S. 754 (1988), and the correspondence
among the Justices about the case are discussed, pp. 62-69, but, as Lazarus points out in a
footnote, "the record in Tompkins is buried in Marshall's papers," p. 68. Some of the memo
randa written by Justice Kennedy on this case and discussed in Closed Chambers may not be
publicly available. See Letter from Judge Alex Kozinski to Edward Lazarus, supra note 29.
67. See Tushnet, supra note 7 ("Lazarus provides rather little evidence to support the
book's most publicized 'revelations."').
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"became the FedEx Justice" (p. 279), that Justice Marshall watched
soap operas in his office (p. 278), and that Justice Kennedy, while
driving, listened to audiotaped briefings of cases prepared by his
clerks (p. 394). Many of these tales have been told before, some in
print68 and some by word of mouth. Whether true or false, such
gossip is of relatively little value to our understanding of the Court,
and most of it is unworthy of inclusion in a book that aspires to
scholarly importance.
Perhaps more important, several Justices, most notably Justices
Marshall, Thomas, Kennedy, and O ' Connor, are portrayed
throughout Closed Chambers as being heavily influenced by clerks
who frame their ideas and even tell them how to vote. A "fre
quently disengaged" Marshall, for example, "cast his vote and that
was about all" as "with a minimum of guidance his clerks did the
work" (p. 278). His successor, Justice Thomas, "looked uninter
ested, often not bothering to remove the rubber band from his stack
of briefs," and took both his ideas and a "hand-me-down" law clerk
from Justice Scalia (p. 457). Conservative clerks secured Justice
Kennedy's vote against stays of execution by getting him to vote
early (p. 270), and a "hypocritical" Justice O'Connor was easily in
fluenced by her clerks in crucial decisions (pp. 299, 391-94). Once
again, substantiation of these claims is lacking because Lazarus
does not disclose from whence this information came.
Finally, there is the infamous conservative clerks' "cabal,''
which, Lazarus alleges, conspired to rig crucial votes - although he
fails to specify how. He attributes statements, often in quotation
marks, to other clerks by name, but does not cite a source. 69 He
sometimes does not even explain whether an attributed statement
was made in a conversation, a memo, or an e-mail.70 The words
used and their context could have been as he reports or could have
been different; we simply have no way of knowing. In many cases,
statements attributed to one clerk could have been made by an
other or could have been made up by somebody along the way.11
The fact that Lazarus refuses to reveal his sources compounds the
problem with his use of multiple hearsay. The fact that most other
former clerks strictly observe their obligation to keep confidences
68. As Lazarus acknowledges, the stories about Justice Marshall had been published
before. See p. 278 (citing Terry Eastland, While Justice Sleeps, NATL.REv., Apr. 21, 1989, at
24). Lazarus merely adds that "[Marshall's] clerks could fume and accuse the cabal of talking
to journalists out of school, but they could not deny." P. 278.
69. See, e.g., p. 265 (quoting an e-mail by Andrew McBride from "mid-September" 1988).
70. See, e.g., p. 269 (quoting exhortation to increase the number of executions in death
penalty cases attributed to an alleged cabal member).
71. For example, the colloquy alleged to have taken place between Paul Cappuccio and
Harry Litman in Justice Kennedy's chambers (pp. 394-95) may have happened the way
Lazarus says it did, may have happened differently, or may not have happened at all. See
supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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also makes it exceedingly difficult for anyone to say that what Laza
rus reports isn't so.72

In sum, many of Lazarus's revelations are supported by little
more than his representations about documents he will not allow
his readers to see and interviews with persons, undoubtedly former
clerks, whose names he will not reveal. With respect to the Chief
Justice's draft opinion and Justice Kennedy's correspondence in
Webster, for example, he is in effect saying to his readers, "Trust
me." After hearing Lazarus's arguments around his duty to keep
the confidences of the Justices,73 not every reader will want to take
this leap of faith.
F.

Lazarus's Lost Perspective

Closed Chambers also suffers from the loss of perspective that
came with Lazarus's decision, perhaps at the urging of his publisher,
to write a book centered on his clerkship rather than on the Court
itself. Although most of the book is organized topically and chron
ologically, Lazarus persistently breaks from the sequence to discuss
his clerkship and to remind the reader that he was an insider.74
Lazarus also believes that he is disclosing a significant amount of
important new information about the Court, and points to the con
troversy surrounding his book as proof of this fact,75 but he fails to
understand that disclosure by a former clerk of any confidential in
formation, however unimportant, will attract attention simply be
cause the disclosure itself is ethically controversial.
Finally, Lazarus lacks perspective because he was a participant
in many of the events he describes, ranging from the battle over the
Bork nomination76 to the cases decided during his clerkship.
Lazarus's participation, however, was that of a clerk, not a Justice,
and he is handicapped by his obsession with disputes among
72. Clerks whom Lazarus casts in an unfavorable light and other clerks who witnessed
what happened cannot answer his claims without themselves breaching confidences in viola
tion of the Code of Conduct.
73. See supra text accompanying notes 45-65.
74. Lazarus's interview with Justice Blackmun and the early days of his clerkship are
discussed, pp. 21-46, before a lengthy historical expose on the death penalty that begins with
Scottsboro and ends with a chapter on the Burger Court entitled "Backlash," pp. 77-118. Tue
book picks up again in 1988 in a chapter entitled "The Death Watch" which begins with the
words, "When I started clerking for Justice Blackmun in July 1988 . . ." P. 119.
75. Lazarus, supra note 3 (responding to on-line book reviews) ("That so many people
. . . react so defensively, almost nonsensically to my book only convinces me that I have
succeeded in touching disturbing truths that no one feels comfortable discussing openly and
honestly. That is satisfying indeed.").
76. See p. 247 ("During the [Senate] hearings, my [Ninth Circuit] co-clerks and I had
spent more than a few off-hours thinking up and funneling to friends on the Senate commit
tee staff questions that would expose the weaknesses and contradictions in Bork's
positions.").
.
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clerks.77 His account, although intriguing when he examines the
Justices' deliberations in the years prior to his clerkship, deterio
rates markedly when he turns to the Court in the late 1980s and
1990s. His discussion of these years would have been more in
sightful if he had continued to focus on communications among the
Justices, which abound in publicly available papers, and had
avoided more trivial communications between Justices and clerks,
and particularly among the clerks themselves.
G.

Lazarus's Motive

Why does Lazarus breach his own confidences with Justice
Blackmun, repeat statements made by clerks who are also breach
ing confidences, and quote from confidential documents, particu
larly when Closed Chambers would have been just as strong a book,
and probably a stronger book, if he had not done so? Unfortu
nately, promotional objectives, at least in the mind of Lazarus's
publisher, appear to have dominated concerns about both ethics
and editorial quality. The front of the book's cover boldly adver
tises that Lazarus is a "Former Supreme Court Clerk," while the
back cover crows, "A Rare Clerk's-Eye View of the Supreme
Court." The review copy boasted that "[f]or the first time ever, a
former Supreme Court clerk reveals what really goes on at the
world's most powerful legal institution" and that "[n]ever before
has a Supreme Court clerk told the true story of how the Court
decides cases." The inside-cover synopsis of the published version
promises that Lazarus will "guide[ ] the reader through the Court's
inner sanctum, explaining as only an eyewitness can the collisions of
law, politics, and personality." All this makes it appear that sales
and hype got the better of good judgment. For a book that is so
well written, by an author of such promise,78 this is tragic.
Unfortunately, the promotion effort may not end there.
Lazarus has already given television and radio interviews about
Closed Chambers, 79 and according to the inside front cover of the
review copy, he was commissioned by Warner Brothers to write a
screenplay about the Court. In a subsequent interview Lazarus
pointed out that his screenplay was commissioned in 1991 and is
77. The most outlandish revelation in Closed Chambers does not pertain to any specific
case before the Court, but to a fight between two clerks, a liberal and a conservative, that
ended when both fell into the fountain in the Court's courtyard. P. 419. While amusing, this
anecdote only underscores the immaturity of at least some of the Court's clerks, not their
level of influence over the more serious issues that were before the Justices.
78. Lazarus's first book, BLACK Hiu.s/WHTIE JUSTICE: THE Sioux NATION VERSUS THE
UNITED STATES, 1775 TO THE PRESENT (1991), was favorably reviewed in several publica
tions, including the Harvard Law Review. See, e.g., Recent Publications, 106 HARV. L. REV.
810, 811 (1993) (book notice).
79. See supra note 45 (citing radio and television interviews with Lazarus).

Clerk Confidentiality

May 1999]

1453

fictional.80 Nonetheless, the prospect of a former Supreme Court
clerk selling to Hollywood a story about the Court and then writing
a book disclosing the confidences of the Justices is probably not
what the Justices contemplated when they first invited recent law
graduates into their chambers over a century ago.

II.
A.

CLERKS

AND

CONFIDENCES

The Relationship Between Judges and Law Clerks

Chief Judge Horace Gray of the Massachusetts Supreme Judi
cial Court in 1875 became the first judge to employ law clerks, most
of whom were recent graduates of the Harvard Law School where
his brother John Chipman Gray was a professor.81 When Justice
Gray was appointed to the United States Supreme Court in 1882,
he brought his clerk to Washington.82 The other Justices eventually
followed suit, and by 1939 all were employing clerks.83 For years, a
clerk's obligation to keep the confidences of the Court was an un
written rule, and a foundation of the Justice-clerk relationship.84
80. See Collins & Skover, Interview with Lazarus, supra note 19.
81. See J. Daniel Mahoney, Law Clerks: For Better or For Worse? 54 BROOK. L. REv.
321, 322 (1988); see also JOHN OAKLEY & ROBERT s. THOMPSON, LAW CLERKS AND THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS: PERCEPTIONS OF THE QUALITIES AND FUNCTIONS OF LAW CLERKS IN
AMERICAN COURTS 10 (1980); Paul R. Baier, The Law Clerks: Profile of an Institution, 26
VAND L. REv. 1125, 1129-30 (1973); Chester A. Newland, Personal Assistants to Supreme
Court Justices: The Law Clerks, 40 OR. L. REv. 299, 301 (1961).
82. See Mahoney, supra note 81, at 322-23.
83. See id.
84. See id. at 325. David Garrow, in his review of CLOSED CHAMBERS, recounts past
incidents of public disclosures by former Supreme Court law clerks and concludes that Laza
rus's conduct is entirely in keeping with this "under-appreciated tradition." See David J.
Garrow, "The Lowest Form of Animal Life"? Supreme Court Clerks and Supreme Court
History, 84 CoRNELL L.REv. 855, 893-94 (1999) (book review). Garrow recites a long list of
illustrious former clerks, including Secretary of State Dean Acheson and Harvard Law
School Dean James Landis, who presumably breached confidences, and even goes so far as to
suggest that "the first true precursor to Lazarus among former clerks was one of Justice
Gray's own early appointees, Samuel Williston." Id. at 860. A careful review of Garrow's
examples, however, reveals that almost all of these former clerks publicly discussed or wrote
about their clerkships 30 to 60 years after their clerkships ended and after the Justices to
whom they owed the duty to keep confidences were dead, along with most if not all of their
colleagues on the Court. These include Samuel Williston, see id. at 860, who clerked for
Justice Horace Gray in October Term 1888 and then wrote about his clerkship 52 years later
in a 1940 autobiography (Justice Gray died in 1902); Dean Acheson, see id. at 860-81, who
clerked for Justice Louis D. Brandies in October Terms 1919 and 1920 and then wrote about
his clerkship 45 years later in a 1965 autobiography (Justice Brandies died in 1941); C. Dick
erson Williams, see id. at 861-62, who clerked for Justice William Howard Taft in October
Term 1924 and then wrote about his clerkship 65 years later in a 1989 article (Justice Taft died
in 1930); Alfred McCormack, see id. at 862, who clerked for Justice Harlan Fiske Stone in
October Term 1925 and then told a few stories from his clerkship 21 years later in a 1946 law
review article (Justice Stone died that same year); and James M. Landis, see id. at 862-63, who
clerked for Justice Brandeis in October Term 1925 and then told some humorous anecdotes
from his clerkship 32 years later in a 1957 public talk. Although the duty to keep confidences
arguably survives the death of the Justices to whom that duty is owed, see infra text accompa
nying notes 140-41, it is understandable that some former clerks have taken a different view.
.
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Clerks have usually been careful about preserving confidentiality,
but the Justices have on occasion had to remind them of its impor
tance, as Justice Stone did in a memorandum to his clerks in the
1930s:
Washington is infested with a cheap class of newspaper hangers-on
who at times have cultivated the law clerks of the justices and picked
up scraps of conversation or remarks which are harmless enough in
themselves, but which, when distorted and published, tend to discredit
the Court or its member[s] in public estimation. Much of this has
been the result of idle gossip which goes on among the law clerks
themselves, and when it is ultimately published, after being several
times repeated, bears little resemblance to its original form.85
Justice Stone went on to say that he believed his clerks were mature
enough "to appreciate this fact and refrain from commenting to
outsiders about the observations which they gain from the intimate
association into which they have been invited. "86
B.

The Brethren

Few clerks openly admit having breached the confidences of
their Justices.87 In 1979, however, Bob Woodward and Scott Arm
strong compiled a book from interviews with former Supreme
Court clerks and from documents delivered to them by some of
These examples are clearly distinguishable from the conduct of Lazarus and his sources,
whose disclosures were published only nine years after their clerkships ended and while al
most all of the Justices for whom they had clerked were still alive.
Furthermore, only one of Garrow's examples involves what was arguably unauthorized
use of confidential documents from Supreme Court files. John D. Fassett, who clerked for
Justice Stanley Reed in October Term 1953, gave a 1966 speech to "the Benchers," a group of
Connecticut lawyers and judges about Justice Reed's position on Brown v. Board of Educa
tion. See Garrow, supra, at 868 (citing John D. Fassett, Mr. Justice Reed and Brown v. Board
of Education, 1986 SUP. CT. HIST. SoCY. Y.B. 48, 48 (publishing the text of Fassett's 1966
speech)). In the speech, Fassett quoted internal Court memoranda from a folder marked
"segregation" that Fassett had removed from the Court without asking permission from Jus
tice Reed. Fassett, however, specifically asked his audience to advise him on when he should
make these details public, to respect his confidence, and not to publicly discuss the content of
the speech in the meantime. Fassett, supra, at 49. Fassett's conduct, although not necessarily
commendable, is distinguishable in several respects from the apparent conduct of sources
used for CLOSED CHAMBERS. Frrst, in 1953 there was no express prohibition on removal of
documents from the Court similar to that in the Code of Conduct. Code of Conduct, supra
note 11, canon 3C. Second, Fassett recognized the ethical concerns raised by his revelations,
asked his audience to keep his remarks confidential, and postponed publication of the speech
until 20 years after it was delivered, and six years after the death of Justice Reed in 1980.

85. George Gold, Loose Tongues, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1985, at 28 (quoting a memorandum
from Justice Stone to his law clerks filed in Box 48 of Stone's papers in the Library of
Congress).
86. Id.
Even though the book jacket and review copy of Closed Chambers tout the book as
an insider expose, see supra text accompanying note 77, Lazarus has gone to great lengths to
argue that he has not breached the Court's confidences. See arguments listed supra Section

87.

I.D.
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those clerks.88 Woodward and Armstrong were journalists, not law
yers, and anticipating that the conduct of their sources would come
under attack, refused to reveal their names.89
Reaction was swift and much of it harsh. Anthony Lewis wrote
that The Brethren was "character assassination" amounting to "hit
and run journalism," and that "significant factual errors" raised
questions about whether the authors knew what they were talking
about.90 A review by John Leonard in the New York Times pointed
out that the book "read[s] everybody's mind without identifying a
single source."91 Commentators, liberal and conservative alike, in
cluding Gerald Gunther, James Kilpatrick, George Will, and Floyd
Abrams, were even more critical of the former clerks who had
breached confidences and apparently saw themselves as being at
the center of the Court's work.92 These condemnations, however,
did not discourage some former Clerks from talking yet again, and
in 1983 Bernard Schwartz published Superchief,93 an account of the
Court under Chief Justice Earl Warren which also drew on informa
tion from former clerks, although less so than The Brethren. After
publication of these books, it is not surprising that, when the Court
decided to promulgate a written Code of Conduct for its clerks in
1989, the longstanding confidentiality rule was embodied in Canons
2 and 3 of the new Code.94
C.

Previous Accounts by Former Clerks

In their writings, as well as spoken words, former clerks have
generally been careful in what they say about the Court. One de
parture from this tradition was a 1987 interview with the Harvard
Law Review in which a former Frankfurter clerk, Philip Elman, dis
closed conversations he had with Justice Frankfurter about Brown
88. See WoomvARD & ARMsTRONG, supra note 2.
89. See id. at 3-4.
90. See Alexander Wohl, Those Who Do Not Remember the Past . . . Closed Chambers
An Eerie Echo Eighteen Years After The Brethren, JURIST: BooKS-ON-LAw (May 1998)
<http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/lawbooks/pamay98.htm> (quoting a review by Anthony Lewis in
the New York Review of Books).
91. Id. (quoting a review by John Leonard in The New York Times).
92. See id. ("When I clerked for the Supreme Court I felt it was a damned confidential
job. Both the skill of Woodward and Armstrong and the insensitivity of the law clerks show a
significant and depressing change of standards." (quoting Gerald Gunther commenting to
Macleans)); id. ("If there be scandal in The Brethren, . . . this is it. Clerks are retained by
members of the Court under conditions of absolute confidence. . . . Many of them, it seems
apparent, learned much law but nothing of honor." (quoting James Kilpatrick, reviewing the
book for the National Review)); id. ("Many clerks betrayed not merely their institution, but
also standards of common decency." (quoting George Will, writing in Newsweek)); id.
("[T]he law clerks now think that they run the place - or that they should." (quoting Floyd
Abrams, writing for Fortune)).
93. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPERCHIEF (1983).
94. See CoDE OF CONDUCT, supra note 11, Canons 2 & 3.
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v. Board ofEducation and other cases that were before the Court in
the 1950s.95 These conversations, however, took place after

Elman's clerkship, and his revelations were controversial not be
cause the conversations were confidential, but because they took
place while Elm.an was filing amicus briefs on behalf of the Solicitor
General's office in these very same cases. The longstanding prohi
bition on ex parte contacts suggested that these conversations never
should have occurred in the first place.96
Other former clerks have written books about the Court. These
include J. Harvie Wilkinson, now Chief Judge of the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals, who in 1974 wrote a book about his clerkship for
Justice Powell,97 but was careful to respect the Court's confi
dences.98 Professor John Jeffries, another former Powell clerk, in
1994 also wrote a book about Justice Powell, who cooperated by
giving Jeffries access to his files and his memories.99 Jeffries also
spoke with nine of Justice Powell's colleagues on the Court.10°
Neither of these authors concealed the identity of their sources or
disclosed confidential memoranda or draft opinions without author
ization. In 1998, Professor Dennis Hutchinson, a former clerk for
Justice Byron White, published an unauthorized biography of Jus
tice White.101 The book relies on interviews with White's former
95. See The Solicitor General's Office, Justice Frankfurter, and Civil Rights Litigation,
An Oral History, 100 HAR.v. L. REv. 817 (1987) (interview by Norman Silber
with Philip Elman).
96. See CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 3 (1908) ("A lawyer should not com
municate or argue privately with the Judge as to the merits of a pending cause
); MODEL
CODE, supra note 48, DR 7-110 (prohibiting ex parte contacts); MoDEL RuLES, supra note
48, Rule 3.5(b) (same).
97. See J. HARVIE WILKINSON, III, SERVING JUSTICE (1974).
98. See id. at xiii ("Much of what goes on within the Supreme Court must be kept in
confidence if the spirit of frank and informal exchange there is to continue to prevail. The
need for such confidence in the Court's deliberations will always be important, and I have
tried in every instance to respect it.")
99. See JoHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JuSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. ix (1994) ("Many people
helped make this book possible. The greatest debt is owed to Lewis F. Powell, Jr., who
generously gave me access to his files and his memories without attempting to control what I
wrote.").
100. See id. ("Other than Justices William 0. Douglas and Potter Stewart, both of whom
died before this project began, I have spoken with all of Powell's colleagues on the Supreme
Court. They include Chief Justices William H. Rehnquist and Warren E. Burger and Associ
ate Justices William J. Brennan, Byron White, Thurgood Marshall, Harry Blackmun, John
Paul Stevens, Sandra Day O'Connor, and Antonin Scalia.")
101. See DENNIS J. HUTCHINSON, THE MAN WHo ONCE WAs WHIZZER WHITE (1998).
David Garrow claims that "both Lazarus and Hutchinson have used exactly the same meth
ods to make almost exactly the same sorts of novel disclosures." Garrow, supra note 84, at
893. Garrow also suggests that Hutchinson may have been offered copies of documents that
other former clerks retained after their clerkships. See id. at 892. The first of these state
ments is simply wrong. Hutchinson wrote about events that occurred outside his clerkship
year. See Letter from Anthony Kronman to Richard Painter, supra note 9 {"I do think a
different and more difficult question arises when a former clerk reports confidences pertain
ing to events that occurred either before or after his or her clerkship year."). Furthermore,
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clerks, but does not use confidential documents from the Court's
:files.102
Other former clerks, including Professors Richard Revesz and
Pamela Karlan,103 have written law review articles about cases that
were decided during their Term on the Court, but they have been
careful not to disclose confidential communications with the Jus
tices and only to use documents from the public record. Lazarus
himself in 1994 wrote a four-page law review tribute to Justice
Blackmun in which private conversations within Blackmun's cham
bers were disclosed,104 but presumably this was done with Justice
Blackmun's permission, and the article did not disclose confidential
communications from the chambers of other Justices.

D.

The Extent and Limits of Confidentiality

Lazarus goes outside the parameters of ethical conduct by dis
closing communications made directly to him and to other clerks by
Justices of the Court, and by using documents that may have been
illegally removed from the Supreme Court building.105 Although
some former clerks have written or spoken about confidential com
munications decades after their clerkships, and generally after the
Justices to whom they owed the duty to keep confidences were
dead,1°6 most former clerks who have written about the Court lim
ited themselves to the public record or that which they were permit
ted to disclose, and have not cast suspicion on themselves by
refusing to reveal their sources.
·

Nonetheless, there is still some ambiguity, perhaps too much
ambiguity, in the duty of confidentiality that law clerks owe to their
Justices. Because dismay over Closed Chambers should be turned
to more constructive ends than mere condemnation, this review
there is no evidence whatsoever that Professor Hutchinson was given, or has used, any non
public Supreme Court documents. Edward Lazarus did use nonpublic documents (dating
from the year in which he clerked) that somebody apparently removed from the Supreme
Court building. See supra text accompanying notes 27-29.
102. Much of the book is about White's life before he joined the Court, including his
career as a football star. Hutchinson avoids discussing the 1975 Tenn in which he clerked for
White and focuses on three of the Court's other Terms: 1971, 1981, and 1991.
103. See Richard L. Revesz & Pamela S. Karlan, Nonmajority Rules and the Supreme
Court, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 1067, 1068-109 (1988) (discussing erosion of non-majoritarian
court rules in the death penalty stay process during the 1980s).
104. See Edward P. Lazarus, The Case of the Severed Arm: A Tribute to Associate Justice
Harry A. Blackmun, 43 AM. U. L. REv. 725 (1994) (discussing Blackmun's dissent in Green v.
Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504 (1989)). This brief article was mostly based on the
public record, including the Marshall papers, but did include a brief discussion of a post
conference meeting of Justice Blackmon with his clerks. See id. at 727�28.
105. See supra text accompanying notes 22-29.
106. See Garrow, supra note 84, at 860-75; supra note 84 (discussing some of Garrow's
examples).
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seeks to begin a dialogue on the parameters of this duty. Interest
ing questions abound.

1.

Communications by Law Clerks

May a clerk disclose his own side of a communication with a
Justice so long as he does not disclose what the Justice said or did in
response? Once a confidential relationship is shown to exist, as it
clearly does exist between a Justice and her clerks, the zone of con
fidentiality is defined by whether the parties to that relationship
would reasonably expect a communication to be kept confiden
tial.107 Most communications from a law clerk to a Justice fall
within the ambit of communications for which confidentiality is
expected.
Draft opinions and bench memoranda prepared by clerks are
usually kept confidential, sometimes even from the chambers of
other Justices.108 Draft opinions by definition contain the ideas of
one or more Justices, and bench memoranda reveal what topics a
Justice has asked her clerk to research. Public disclosure of draft
opinions and bench memoranda would also allow an outsider to re
construct whether a Justice was influenced by another Justice or by
a clerk and how. Finally, widespread expectation of confidentiality
is demonstrated by the fact that the contents of draft opinions and
bench memoranda are almost never disclosed to outsiders by clerks
or former clerks, except by those who are unwilling to identify
themselves.
With respect to oral communications, a law clerk who discloses
his own or another clerk's side of a conversation with a Justice, but
not what the Justice said in response, merely puts some guesswork
into discerning the Justice's thoughts. Also, the clerk's advice itself
should be confidential. A lawyer would act unethically if he dis
closed to outsiders the advice he gave to a client (such advice is also
107. Most cases defining which communications in a confidential relationship are in fact
confidential have been decided under the various evidentiary privileges, principally the
attorney-client privilege. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 121 F3d 971, 976 (5th Cir.
1997) ("'It is vital to a claim of privilege that the communication have been made and main
tained in confidence'. . . . The assertor of the privilege must have a reasonable expectation of
confidentiality, either that the information disclosed is intrinsically confidential, or by show
ing that he had a subjective intent of confidentiality." (quoting United States v. Pipkins, 528
F.2d 559, 563 (5th Cir. 1976))), cert. denied 118 S. Ct. 731 (1992). The lawyer's duty to keep
the confidences of a client is, of course, broader than the privilege, and even if communica
tions between a Justice and her clerk were not privileged at all, the clerk still has an ethical
duty not to voluntarily disclose confidences. See supra text accompanying notes 38-39.
108. Lazarus points out, for example, that Chief Justice Rehnquist's draft opinion in Web
ster was purportedly circulated only to the Court's more conservative Justices. P. 402. It is

even more common for bench memoranda and similar work product of clerks not to be
circulated beyond a Justice's chambers.
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routinely covered by the attorney-client privilege).109 Likewise, the
words "complete confidentiality" and "loyalty" in Canon 2 of the
Code of Conduct cannot fairly be construed to permit a clerk to
divulge to outsiders the nature of the advice he gave to a Justice.
Finally, the Justices depend on their clerks for advice, making
frank communication from clerk to Justice even more important
than frank communication the other way around. Clerks will not
tell the Justices what they really think if they fear revelation, per
haps to future clients or employers, of communications overheard
by other clerks. If such disclosure were allowed, much of the value
to the Court of clerkships would be lost.110

2.

Communications Between Law Clerks

Are communications between law clerks covered by the duty to
keep confidences? Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct refers to
"highly confidential circulations from the chambers of other Jus
tices," that the clerk may "never" disclose.111 This language clearly
implies that confidential relationships exist not only between Jus
tices and clerks, but also between clerks and persons in each Jus
tice's chambers, including other clerks. The Code, however, does
not define which communications from a Justice's chambers are
confidential and which are not. Once again, this distinction turns
largely on whether the parties to the relationship, in "this case the
sender and recipient of a communication, would reasonably expect
it to be kept confidential.
It could be argued that memoranda and oral communications
from law clerks to each other are subject to a lower expectation of
confidentiality, assuming they do not directly or indirectly reveal
communications by or to one of the Justices. However, if the Code
means what it says about confidential communications from the
chambers of the Justices, not just from the Justices themselves,
clerks and other employees of the Court expect a zone of confiden
tiality as well. Although this zone of confidentiality might not ex
tend to clerks' discussion of their personal lives or jokes exchanged
in the Court's cafeteria (neither of which should interest a serious
109. See MoDEL RuLES, supra note 49, Rule 1.6 ("A lawyer shall not reveal information
relating to representation of a client unless the client consents after consultation. . . . ");
MODEL RULES, supra note 49, Rule 1.6 cmt. 5 ("The confidentiality rule applies not merely
to matters co=unicated in confidence by the client but also to all information relating to
the representation, whatever its source."); MoDEL RULES, supra note 49, Rule 1.6 cmt. 5
(discussing the attorney-client privilege as a related body of law).
110. It is entirely possible that the content of such co=unications may come to light
years later if the Justice leaves papers to a public repository. For example, memoranda writ
ten by William Rehnquist when he was clerking for Justice Jackson about Brown v. Board of
Education and other civil rights cases were a source of perceived embarrassment in Rehn
quist's own confirmation hearings for Chief Justice in 1986. P. 146.
111.

CODE oF CoNDucr, supra note

11, Canons

2&3

(emphasis added).
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scholar of the Court anyway), it should extend to clerks' statements
about their work on the Court.
It is true that lawyers practicing in a firm do not, at least under
codes of professional responsibility,112 owe each other a strict duty
of confidentiality with respect to intrafirm conversations that do not
contain confidential client information, disclose a lawyer's planned
strategy on behalf of a client, or otherwise injure the lawyer-client
relationship. This is, however, one area where the analogy to
lawyer-client confidences is not on point. The principal objective of
attorney-client confidentiality is unfettered disclosure of factual in
formation by the client to the attorney, whereas the principal objec
tive of confidentiality within a court, and particularly the Supreme
Court, is unfettered communication of ideas about the law among
persons who have a substantial role in interpreting the law. It is
often helpful for clerks to ask each other about a case or an area of
the law, and frankly discuss their opinions with each other, before
communicating with their Justices. Clerks who fear adverse conse
quences of unpopular ideas will not honestly express opinions to
each other and may as a consequence be less likely to communicate
informed opinions to their Justices.

3.

Electronic Communications

Is there a legitimate expectation of privacy in e-mail communi
cations between Justices and clerks, and between the clerks them
selves? For example, would it be a violation of the Code of
Conduct for a clerk to forward an e-mail from a Justice, or from
another clerk, to a friend working outside the Court?
The answer to both of these questions is "yes." E-mails be
tween clerks and Justices or between clerks themselves, whether
about a case or about an area of the law such as the death penalty,
are subject to an expectation of confidentiality. Unauthorized in
terception of an electronic communication, including e-mail, is a
felony under federal law,113 and the Supreme Court's internal e112. Although codes of professional responsibility do not specifically require lawyers to
keep each other's confidences, apart from their duty to keep client confidences, partnership
or other law governing a firm's organizational structure might create such a duty among
lawyers practicing together in the firm.
113. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat.
1848 (1989) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521
(1994); 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (1994) (criminal penalties including up to five years in jail for repeat
offenders); 18 U.S.C. § 2707 (1994) (civil relief including equitable and declaratory relief,
damages, and attorney's fees); see also Lucy Schlauch Leonard, The High-Tech Legal Prac
tice: Attorney-Client Communications and the Internet, 69 U. COLO. L. REv. 851, 859 (1998)
("Interception of electronic communications is a federal felony under the Electronic Com
munications Privacy Act ("ECPA") . . . . [which was] passed in 1986 as an amendment to the
1968 Federal Wrretapping Act in an effort by Congress to close loopholes in the Act that had
been created by advances in technology. The ECPA provides criminal and civil penalties for
the unauthorized access of stored electronic communications.").
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mail system presumably should carry an even higher expectation of
privacy than e-mail sent over the Internet. Users of that system
also do not expect that a recipient of an e-mail would disseminate it
outside of the courthouse. Furthermore, although there is some de
bate over whether e-mail communications between lawyers and
their clients are protected by the attorney-client privilege,114 there
is little disagreement that e-mail communications from a client are
subject to the attorney's obligation to keep confidences and should
not be voluntarily disclosed by the attorney.115 Likewise, down
loading e-mail from the Supreme Court's system and giving it to a
newspaper or author clearly violates a zone of expected confidenti
ality. Such is not acceptable conduct for a clerk or anyone else.

4. Actions
Should a Justice have a legitimate expectation of privacy regard
ing matters such as whether he listens while driving to audiotapes
on pending cases prepared by his clerks,116 whether he watches tel
evision in his chambers,117 or where he travels and how often?118
Given the potential of such revelations to undermine the relation
ship between Justices and their clerks, there are reasons to believe
that both parties would expect such information to be kept private.

In the lawyer-client relationship, the actions of the client ordina
rily are not protected by the attorney-client privilege. For example,
a court can force an attorney to divulge the amount of a bill the
114. In several recent decisions, courts have extended the privilege to e-mail communica
See National Employment Serv. Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 3 Mass. L. Rptr. 221
(1994) (stating that e-mails between a party's corporate counsel and outside counsel were

tions.

made in the outside counsel's professional capacity, and therefore were privileged and undis
coverable); State ex reL United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Canady, 460 S.E.2d 677 (W. Va.
1995) (e-mail communications held privileged). See generally Colleen L. Rest, Note, Elec
tronic Mail and Confidential Client-Attorney Communications: Risk Management, 48 CASE
W. REs. L. REv. 309, 336-37 (1998).

115. Some jurisdictions even provide that the attorney's duty to take reasonable steps to
assure confidentiality of client communications includes use of encryption or similar technol
ogy. See, e.g., Iowa Supreme Court Board of Professional Ethics and Conduct, formal op. 961 (1996) (stating that the duty to maintain client confidences under DR 4-101 requires attor
neys to encrypt or provide similar protection for "sensitive material" sent to or from clients).
Most jurisdictions, however, allow an attorney to decide on the appropriate level and method
of protection on a case-by-case basis.
116. See p. 394 (reporting that Justice Kennedy "did not ask for much in the way of
written briefings on the cases, but, while driving, he sometimes listened to audiotapes his
clerks prepared summarizing the essentials").
117. See p. 278 (confirming a report that Justice Marshall watched afternoon soaps in his
office).

118. See p. 279 (reporting that Justice Stevens was in Florida "for weeks at a time" and
that "Stevens became the FedEx Justice, sometimes even telephoning his votes in to the
Justices' weekly conference").
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client paid and probably even the whereabouts of the client.119
However, such information is covered by the broader ethical obli
gation of the lawyer to keep confidences learned in the course of
the representation.120 Turning to another analogy, Secret Service
agents can be required to testify about the conduct of the Presi
dent.121 Few, however, would argue that a former Secret Service
agent can ethically write a tell-all book about the President's sex
life. Similarly, the close relationships that Supreme Court Justices
develop with their clerks suggest an expectation on the part of both
parties that clerks will not divulge details about a Justice's personal
life. Furthermore, most information of this sort does not help us
understand the Court, and its disclosure by a former clerk usually
serves little purpose other than to satisfy fascination with gossip.

5.

Use of Confidential Information

May a former law clerk use confidential information that he
does not directly disclose? Rules concerning the use of confidential
information are more amorphous and context-specific than rules
prohibiting its disclosure,122 and the particular use to which the for
mer clerk puts the information is a critical determinant of whether
or not the use is proper.
By way of illustration, it would be unethical and illegal for a
clerk to trade in the securities markets based on non-public infor
mation learned from his clerkship.123 At the other extreme, it
would be permissible for a clerk to make a decision about his career
based on information learned at the Court - for example, ac
cepting a clerkship with another Justice for the following year based
on observations of that Justice's approach to particular cases. Be119. See NooNAN & PAINrER, supra note 6, at 106 {"The identity or whereabouts of a
client also are usually not protected; if demanded by a court or in a lawful subpoena this
information must be disclosed by the lawyer.").
120. See MODEL RULES, supra note 49, Rule 1.6 (a) ("A lawyer shall not reveal informa·
tion relating to representation of a client unless the client consents after consultation
);
MoDEL RuLEs, supra note 49, Rule 1.6 (a) cmt. 5 {"The confidentiality rule applies not
merely to matters co=unicated in confidence by the client but also to all information relat·
ing to the representation, whatever its source."); MODEL CoDE, supra note 48, DR 4-101
(providing that a lawyer shall not knowingly "reveal a confidence or secret of his client" and
defining a "confidence" to be "information protected by the attorney-client privilege under
applicable law" and a "secret" to be "other information gained in the professional relation·
ship that the client has requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be em
barrassing or would be likely to be detrimental to the client").
121. See In re Sealed Case, No. 98-3069, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 16289, at *1 (D.C. Cir.,
July 16, 1998) (per curiam) ("[The Department of] Justice has not made a sufficient showing
that irreparable harm will result unless a stay and an order are issued, and it has not made a
sufficient showing that it will ultimately prevail in establishing the privilege it alleges.").
122. Compare, e.g., MODEL RuLES, supra note 49, Rule 1.6 (prohibiting disclosure of
confidential information without client consent) with Rule 1.8 (prohibiting use of client infor
mation to the disadvantage of the client without client consent).
123. See generally Painter et al., supra note 7.
. . • ."
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tween these two extremes lie the many ways in which former law
clerks, many of whom become law professors, use information from
their clerkships to enrich articles and books about the Court and
the cases it decides. In this area, there are few clear rules other
than those prohibiting publication of confidential communications,
although common sense suggests that additional caveats should be
observed as well.
First, indirect or covert disclosure of confidential information,
for example by attributing it to unidentified sources or attributing
truth to previously published rumor, is as reprehensible as direct
and overt disclosure. There is little difference between a former
clerk to Justice Breyer saying, "Justice Breyer told me that he has
strong reservations about affirmative action" and the same clerk
saying without citation to any specific source, "it is known at the
Court that Justice Breyer has strong reservations about affirmative
action." In the latter case, the author's statement, assuming it is
true, is presumptively based on communications made by Justice
Breyer to the author or to another clerk who then repeated them to
the author. There is also little difference between a former clerk for
the Court saying "Justice Marshall watched soap operas while his
clerks wrote opinions" and saying that the National Review pub
lished such a rumor that his clerks could protest but "could not
deny" (p. 278) .
Second, a former clerk should either avoid writing about cases
decided during his clerkship or carefully explain how he arrives at
conclusions about those cases. If a former clerk for Justice Breyer
writes of a case decided while he was a clerk, "Professor Smith's
theory on why Justice Breyer changed his vote is wrong," the state
ment implies that the writer knows this from his experience as a
clerk, unless the writer clearly states how his conclusion is based on
interpretation of another publicly available source, such as the case
itself or another case. Clarifying one's reasoning and specifying
one's sources avoids the appearance that confidential information is
being misused or disclosed.
On the other hand, it is permissible for a former clerk to use in
later scholarly work the ideas that he formed while working on a
case,124 so long as the clerk does not reveal what he said or wrote to
the Justices about the case or what was said in response. Identifica
tion of memoranda and draft opinions that are not already in pub
licly available papers also would be improper. Similarly, in
situations where the ethics of proper attribution require acknowl124. Both the Code of Conduct and federal criminal statutes, however, prohibit unau
thorized removal of records from the Supreme Court building. See supra notes 35-42 and
accompanying text. These prohibitions arguably apply to bench memoranda, making it diffi
cult to rely extensively on one's own work product in a later scholarly work.
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edgment of the original but confidential ideas of others, whether
clerks or Justices, the ideas should not be used.
Finally, a former clerk has more latitude when writing about
terms other than the term during which she clerked, in part because
events that happened during her clerkship are not likely to be cen
tral to her analysis. Nonetheless, Justices do tell their clerks what
they think about past cases and how they might decide an issue in
the future, and the former clerk should be careful not to give the
impression that she is conveying information about the content of
these communications. Furthermore, former clerks from earlier or
later years may be more likely to talk to another former clerk about
what transpired during their terms simply because she can be ex
pected to keep what is said (including hearsay about what the Jus
tice said) confidential. Regardless of whether it is proper for clerks
from different terms to have such conversations about the Court,125
the practice is tolerated precisely because the parties to the conver
sation, and the Justices themselves, expect that information im
parted when former clerks exchange "war stories" will not be
communicated to a broader audience. These expectations should
be respected.
6. Role Change: Former Law Clerks as Journalists
The roles of a law clerk and a journalist are very different. The
clerk is charged with informing the Justice for whom he works, and
occasionally other members of the Court, about the law and facts in
cases before the Court. As discussed above, confidentiality be
tween clerk and Justice is critical to effective performance of this
role. The journalist, by contrast, is charged with informing the pub
lic about newsworthy events, such as cases before the Court. Confi
dentiality is important to the journalist's role only insofar as it is
needed to protect the identity of sources who, without assurance of
anonymity, would not divulge what the journalist wants to know.
The roles of a lawyer and a journalist are also very different.
The lawyer, like the journalist, has an obligation to pursue truth.
The lawyer, however, pursues a partisan truth and works within the
framework of a legal system which imposes restraints that the law
yer must observe.126 Law and legal process are particularly impor125. Exchanging "war stories" in this manner is technically a violation of the confid ential·
ity provisions of the Code of Conduct, see supra text accompanying note 111, and would be a
more serious violation if it were known that one of the parties to the conversation would
disclose the content of the conversation to a broader audience.
126. See generally Lon L. Fuller & John D. Randall, Professional Responsibility: Report
of the Joint Conference of the American Bar Association and the Association of American
Law Schools, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159 (1958).
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tant for the lawyer,127 and a lawyer is responsible for assuring that
the persons she works with obey the law.128 The journalist, on the
other hand, should obey the law in gathering information, but has a
lesser responsibility for assuring that her sources comply with the
law.129 Courts, for example, have usually refrained from enjoining
publication of information that a journalist obtained because of
someone else's violation of the law.130
Sometimes these roles, and their respective ethical obligations,
collide because a person performs one role and then seeks to per
form another. Specific rules address the common changeover from
the role of a law clerk to that of a lawyer, for example by disqualify
ing a former clerk from cases on which she worked during her
clerkship.131 The transition from law clerk to journalist, however, is
not so easy, and is even more difficult if the clerk-turned-journalist
also becomes a lawyer, as Lazarus did when he joined the bar in the
midst of his work on Closed Chambers. Needless to say, the situa
tion becomes even more precarious when the clerk-turned
journalist-turned-lawyer chooses to be a federal prosecutor, who is
sworn not only to uphold the law, but to enforce the law.
It is not always easy to distinguish when these roles - some
times assumed in succession and sometimes assumed concurrently
- are separable along with the duties that flow with them. May a
clerk-turned-journalist embrace the ethics of journalism, which per
mit him to use information disclosed unethically by others? Must a
lawyer carry the morals of the legal profession, which prohibit her
from gathering evidence illegally or encouraging others to do so,132
into her work as a journalist, or may she take off her lawyer's hat
and put on that of a journalist? In any of these situations, should
there be more tolerance for successive role conflicts (the clerk127. See MODEL RuLES, supra note 49, pmbl. 4 ("A lawyer's conduct should conform to
the requirements of the law
A lawyer should demonstrate respect for the legal system
. . . . While it is a lawyer's duty, when necessary, to challenge the rectitude of official action,
it is also a lawyer's duty to uphold legal process.").
128. See, e.g., MODEL RuLES, supra note 49, Rule 5.3 (stating that a lawyer is "responsi
ble for conduct of [a non-lawyer employed or retained by or associated with the lawyer] that
would be a violation of the rules of professional conduct if engaged in by a lawyer" if the
lawyer orders or ratifies the conduct involved).
129. See Felicity Barringer, New Rules, New Caution: Telling a Journalistic Coup from a
Crime, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 1998, § 4, at 1 ("For journalists, it is second nature to draw a line
between stealing information (forbidden) and accepting pilfered information (fine). . . .
Questions about the origin and highly classified status of the Pentagon Papers didn't keep
The New York TIIlles and The Washington Post from publishing them in 1971. In fact, The
TIIlles was awarded a Pulitzer Prize for public service.").
130. See, e.g., New York TIIlles Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam).
131. See, e.g., MODEL RuLES, supra note 49, Rule 1.11 ("Successive Government and
Private Employment").
132. See MODEL RULES, supra note 49, Rule 4.4 (stating that a lawyer may not use meth
ods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of another person).
. . • .
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turned-journalist) than for conflicts that are concurrent (the clerk
or lawyer who simultaneously works as a journalist)?133
A few general observations. First, new ethical obligations do
not erase old ones that would otherwise survive the termination of
a past relationship (such as the duty to keep confidences). When
new ethical obligations cannot be carried out without infringing
upon old ones, the actor should withdraw from her new role. For
example, if a journalist cannot write a factually accurate story with
out breaching confidences from a prior clerkship, she should seek
another assignment. New role-specific obligations usually are not
forced upon actors, as new roles can be turned down.
Second, when ethical obligations do not conflict, an actor may
assume a second role, but with the caveat that conflict might occur
in the future. A clerk-turned-journalist will experience few
problems if she writes about something other than the term in
which she was a clerk.134 H she does write about cases decided by
the same court in the same term, she should use only the public
record and carefully identify her sources. A former clerk who in
stead offers anonymity to a source in return for information (jour
nalists are not required to make such an offer) has no way of
convincing her critics that she is not herself supplying the informa
tion and attributing it to an unnamed source. If the clerk-turned
journalist is also a lawyer, she confronts an additional dilemma if
her source has violated the law or is a lawyer who has acted unethi
cally, and she does not report him to the appropriate authority.135
133. Such a distinction is made in the client conflicts area. Compare MoDEL RULES,
supra note 49, Rule 1.7 ("Conflict of Interest: General Rule") (prohibiting concurrent repre
sentation of a client with an interest adverse to another client in any matter) with Rule 1.9
("Conflict of Interest: Former Client") (prohibiting successive representation of a client with
an interest adverse to a former client in the same or a substantially related matter).

134. The analysis is more ambiguous if the former clerk-turned-journalist is writing about
a Term other than the one during which she clerked. Assuming the former clerk is not a
lawyer, and thus has no continuing duty not to encourage or take advantage of ethical
breaches by others, see supra text accompanying note 62, she arguably stands in a position no
different from that of Woodward and Armstrong, the authors of The Brethren, when she
interviews former clerks who are themselves breaching confidences. Her conduct may be
particularly unseemly in view of the obligations that she previously had to the Court, but it is
her sources, not she, who are breaching ethical obligations. Nonetheless, she probably
crosses the line when she receives from her sources documents that were improperly re
moved from the courthouse, see supra text accompanying notes 26-29. This concern is partic
ularly serious if the documents existed at the time of her clerkship and she has no way of
proving that she did not herself remove them from the building. Furthermore, the former
clerk-turned-journalist acts unethically if she takes advantage of her status as a former clerk
to induce other former clerks to disclose facts that they would not ordinarily disclose to
outsiders, particularly if she does not inform them in advance that the information imparted
will be disseminated publicly. See supra text accompanying note 125, concerning former
clerks exchanging "war stories" that neither they nor the Justices expect to be shared with
outsiders.
135. See MODEL RuLES, supra note 49, Rule 8.3 (requiring a lawyer to inform the appro
priate professional authority if she has knowledge of another lawyer's violation of the rules
of professional conduct that "raises a substantial question as to that lawyer's honesty, trust-
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She can avoid many of these problems, however, if she refrains
from obtaining confidential information from sources who are un
willing to be named.
Third, like anyone, a former clerk should be careful not to as
sume too many roles at once. Although the Code of Conduct pro
hibits disclosure of the Court's confidences regardless of a clerk's
subsequent status, Lazarus's assumption of the additional roles of
lawyer and prosecutor only heightened his ethical obligations with
respect to protecting the Court's confidences and the documents
within its files. His publisher advertised his position with the
United States Attorney on the dust jacket of Closed Chambers, but
it was Lazarus's responsibility to ascertain and carry out the ethical
obligations that this new position entailed.136
7. How Long Does the Duty Survive?
Lazarus has incorrectly argued that the Code of Conduct does
not survive a clerkship,137 but he apparently does recognize some
obligation of confidentiality, albeit an amorphous one, that survives
the clerkship.138 His interpretation of this obligation, however, re
fuses to define temporal boundaries and rests on a dubious distinc
tion between that which is current and that which falls "into the
realm of history,"139 the latter category apparently to be defined by
each clerk-turned-historian according to his own moral compass.
As a practical matter, this distinction admits just about any state
ment that a former clerk wants to disclose into the realm of permis
sible disclosure.
Nonetheless, one may legitimately inquire as to whether there
are any qualifications to the word "never" in the Code of Conduct.
In particular, does the duty of confidentiality survive the death of
the Justice who imparted a confidence? If not, does it still survive
worthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects"); MODEL RuLES, supra note 49, Rule 8.4
(stating that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to "(c) engage in conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation" or "(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial
to the administration of justice"); MODEL RULES, supra note 49, Rule 8.4 cmt. 3 ("A lawyer's
abuse of public office can suggest an inability to fulfill the professional role of attorney. The
same is true of abuse of positions of private trust . . . .").
136. See supra text accompanying notes 44, 62, 135
137. See supra text accompanying notes 51-58.
138. See Collins & Skover, Interview with Lazarus, supra note 19 ("[Q:] If it is to be an
institution of fair adjudication, how much secrecy does the Supreme Court need, in your
view? Lazarus: Well, I think a good starting point, it seems to me - during the time that a
case is pending, it is absolutely imperative that the deliberative process be secret. And, on
the other hand, at the other extreme, it seems to me that at some point, these things fall into
the realm of history. And it's a little bit like one of Zeno's paradoxes: How many grains of
sand does it take to make a sandhill? Where is the line? . . . Somewhere between the time
when the case is pending and a substantial time period later is the point where it does fall
into the realm of history.").
139. See id.
.
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the death of all of the Justices on the Court at the time the commu
nication was made? The answer should be grounded in the expec
tations of the Justices themselves, and the Court's 1998 ruling that
the attorney-client privilege survives the death of the client140 sug
gests that the Justices might also expect that their own confidences
would be kept posthumously. Arguably, a Justice might have an
even greater interest in keeping a communication, particularly a
controversial communication, confidential after her death than
when she is alive to explain it.141 On the other hand, communica
tions about specific cases might no longer be sensitive years after
those cases are decided, particularly if the Court is composed
predominantly of new Justices. However, the decision about when
confidences expire, if at all, is perhaps best made by the Justices
themselves.

8. Exceptions to Confidentiality
Some exceptions to confidentiality are necessary. For example,
in appropriate circumstances a court, prosecutor, or Congress
should have the power to compel testimony by a former clerk about
communications with a Justice. Evidence of judicial misconduct
should be disclosed, whether in a criminal trial or impeachment
hearing. A clerk should also disclose information necessary to in
form other members of the same court or another court about im
permissible conflict of interest or bias on the part of a judge or
Justice hearing a case. Finally, a clerk should perhaps disclose
statements by a judge that directly contradict the judge's subse
quent sworn statements in a confirmation hearing for her own nom
ination to a higher court or other office.142
140. See Swidler & Berlin v. United States, il8 S. Ct. 2081 {1998).
141. The author of this review objected in a Wall Street Journal editorial that Lazarus
published an unsubstantiated report that Justice Marshall once responded to an inquiry
about the solution to racism by saying " 'Kill all the white people.' " See Painter, supra note 8
(quoting p. 278). Lazarus responded in his letter to the Journal that the remark was intended
to be a "jest," and that Closed Chambers had given a "compliment" to Justice Marshall by
reporting that he had said it. See Lazarus, supra note 46. This author does not share Laza
rus's sense of humor. In any event, this is surely a compliment that Justice Marshall could do
without. Lazarus also gives no specifics as to time, place, or names of \vitnesses. Further
more, whatever Justice Marshall said he almost certainly said with the expectation that no
body in the room would repeat his remarks publicly. He is not alive to defend himself, and
his expectation of privacy should have been respected.
142. Yet one more exception to the law clerk's duty to keep confidences should be disclo
sure that is necessary for the clerk to defend herself against a negative performance review or
reference letter from the judge. It would be unfair for the judge to document his difficulties
working with the clerk while the clerk is estopped from explaining her side of the story.
Indeed, the Model Rules contain an analogous exception to the lawyer's duty to keep client
confidences. See MoDEL RuLES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 1.6 {1998) (providing that
a lawyer may reveal information necessary "to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the
lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the client").
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Arguments can be made for extending an evidentiary privilege
to clerk-judge communications in at least some of these contexts.143
Indeed, Lazarus's current employer, the Department of Justice, has
unsuccessfully asked the Supreme Court to extend such an eviden
tiary privilege to the relationship between the Secret Service anµ
the President.144 However, when a court, a prosecutor, or Congress
seeks for good cause to compel testimony about a Justice, the im
portance of disclosure to the integrity of the judicial system is more
compelling than when a former clerk writes a book about the
Court. The evidentiary privilege generally is narrower that the duty
to keep confidences,145 and it should be here as well.
9.

Disclosure by a Justice

Regardless of whether Justice Blackmun knew about Closed
Chambers while Lazarus was writing the book, important questions
about the Justices' own duty to keep collfidences have been raised
when Justices assist biographers, give or bequest their papers to
public repositories, or allow scholars access to the same. Do the
Justices owe each other a duty of confidentiality with respect to oral
and written communications amongst themselves? May a Justice
consent to disclosure by a law clerk or other person in her employ?
Does such consent apply only to communications between the Jus
tice and the clerk or also to communications by other Justices?
May a Justice work with a biographer, or allow outsiders access to
his papers without the permission of his fellow Justices? Unlike the
obligation of clerks to keep confidences, these questions are not
addressed by the Supreme Court's rules, although perhaps they
should be.
143. There is reason for concern. Assume the following: Conservative groups remember
the short-lived initiative in the 1960's to "impeach Earl Warren" and once again call for
Congress to investigate "activist judges" with an eye toward impeachment for abuse of
power. The House Judiciary Committee decides to investigate, and begins to collect informa
tion on a dozen judges on the appellate courts and two Supreme Court justices (pick any
two). Former clerks are asked for information about how their bosses made decisions, the
things they said in chambers, and anything else that could be used against them in impeach
ment hearings. Some former clerks tum the information over voluntarily. Others hope to
avoid subpoena by Congress. Query: It is ethical for the former clerks to voluntarily report
on confidential communications with their judges or justices? The Code of Conduct would
prohibit the disclosure, see CoDE OF CoNDucr, supra note 11, Canon 3, and provides no
exception to the ethical obligation to keep confidences, even where the information could be
useful to Congress, which alone has the power to remove judges with life tenure. The more
difficult question, and one that cannot be addressed fully in this book review, is whether
there is, or ought to be, an absolute or qualified privilege that would prevent the former
clerks from being subpoenaed and forced to testify.
144. See In re Sealed Case, No. 98-3069, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 16289 (D.C. Cir., July 16,
1998) (per curiam).
145. See MODEL CODE, supra note 48, EC 4-4 (1983) ("The attorney-client privilege is
more limited than the ethical obligation of a lawyer to guard the confidences and secrets of
his client.").
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There are reasons why Justices should respect each other's con
fidences, the most important being that candid communication
among the Justices is critical to sound judicial decision making. A
potential breach of confidence might even affect the outcome of a
case in which a Justice would reverse her vote after private discus
sions with her colleagues, but would adhere more steadfastly to her
original position if she knew that the process by which she changed
her mind would be aired publicly. Unilateral disclosure, if it be
came the norm while Justices were still sitting on the Court, could
also be used by individual Justices to coerce their colleagues or
score points in the press. The threat of public disclosure of confi
dences could thus become a weapon in the deliberative process it
self, distorting results and causing Justices rarely to disclose to each
other what they really think. Another concern is that a Justice,
probably through a wholesale gift of unsorted papers to a public
repository, could inadvertently disclose confidential communica
tions that would embarrass a colleague while adding little to our
understanding of the Court.
On the other hand, public knowledge of how the Justices arrive
at decisions is important. Interested persons include scholars of the
Court and voters, as well as the President and Senators who shape
the Court's future whenever they appoint and confirm a new Jus
tice. Public revelations concerning the competency of a Justice, for
example, might encourage an incompetent Justice to retire. Public
revelations also might disclose that an excessive number of certain
types of cases - for example death penalty cases - are interfering
with the Court's other work, making statutory reform or creation of
an intermediate appellate court an urgent necessity. Finally, revela
tions that make the political component of the Court's decision
making more transparent help its critics form an opinion about
whether the Court should go in another direction.
Regardless of how these factors in favor of and against disclo
sure balance out, the Justices are in a better position than their
clerks to weigh them and decide. The Justices have a greater inter
est in the Court as an institution and thus an incentive not to make
disclosures that undermine the Court's deliberative process. The
Justices also are more likely to make comprehensive disclosures
rather than disclosures pertaining only to a particular term. The
Justices furthermore are less likely to be influenced by extraneous
factors, such as financial gain or fame from disclosing each other's
confidences. Finally, the law entrusts the Justices with responsibil
ity for the Supreme Court as an institution, whereas clerks have no
such authority or responsibility. Some decisions, such as which law
clerks to hire, are made by the Justices individually. Others, such as
the Court's procedural rules, are made collectively. It could be de
bated whether one or all of the Justices who are part of a confiden-
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tial communication should consent to its disclosure, but the notion
that a clerk has authority to make this determination on par with
that of a Justice is absurd.

CONCLUSION
Lazarus's breach of trust not only raises ethical concerns, but
contributes to the principal substantive weaknesses of the book:
the obsession with goings on among law clerks, the failure to dis
close sources, and the lack of credibility that both the book's author
and his anonymous sources have earned. Many of these concerns
would have been mitigated had Lazarus disclosed only that infor
mation which he and his sources were ethically entitled to disclose,
and he had then divulged the names of his sources and the complete
text and origin of all documents that he used. Lazarus's commit
ments to his sources may now be an obstacle to his disclosing their
identity. Still, however, Lazarus would enhance the credibility and
quality of his account in Closed Chambers if he were to open his
own files and make his disclosure complete.

